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SUMMARY 
 
Corporate governance has been a subject of intensive research efforts by scholars but 
with a distinct and overwhelming focus on U.S. and European firms. Using agency 
theory as a theoretical basis, researchers have studied the implication of ownership 
structure and diversification strategy on a firm’s performance in developed economies. 
Such studies in emerging market economies are comparatively limited. I integrate 
existing research on ownership structure, diversification strategy and firm 
performance in a study that looks at these issues for firms listed on China’s Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock markets. The setting of China provides good opportunities to test 
the robustness of previous findings in a unique and changing institutional setting.  I 
explore these issues using traditional measures of ownership, diversification and 
performance along with Rumelt’s classification of diversification strategy.  
 
The data to be tested consist of all the China’s listed companies from 1991 to 2002, as 
compiled from multiple archival sources. I discuss both the outcomes and evolution 
patterns of these firms’ diversification strategies in this thesis. 
 
My study has four major streams of findings. First, I find that ownership 
concentration is negatively related to firm diversification. In addition, I find that state 
shareholding is also negatively related to firm diversification. Secondly, I find a 
positive relationship between China’s firms’ diversification and performance, which 
is against the conventional wisdom derived from observations of firms in the Western 
  X 
countries (Servaes, 1996). The third set of my findings is about the contingent effect 
of ownership structure on the relationship between firm diversification and firm 
performance. I find that legal person moderates the relationship between firm 
diversification and firm performance (Figure 7-2). Here the moderating effect means 
that Legal Person Shareholding makes the slope of the inverted U-shape curve 
between firm diversification and firm performance more flat. Finally, I did not find a 
significant performance gap between firms of various diversification categories based 
on Rumelt’s scheme, but I find Conglomerates and Single Business firms to show 
much better performance than Dominant Unrelated firms. In addition, I find a general 
trend towards higher levels of firm diversification for all the China’s listed companies 
through the decade after the two stock markets were established. 
 
Key words: corporate governance, ownership structure, diversification strategy 
 
 








Corporate governance has been the focus of decades of research (Ravenscraft & 
Scherer, 1987; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Shelifer & Vishny, 
1997). This research stream emerged with the modern form of corporation in which 
there was a separation of finance (ownership) and management of firms. This 
separation may be due to the fact that as the scale of firms kept growing, the owner of 
the firm began to lack expertise or time to monitor its daily operations. Therefore, 
professional managers were introduced into the management and supervised the 
operation of the firm on the behalf of the owner (Coase, 1937). Agency theory has 
thus developed to deal with the agency problems that arise when an owner allocates 
management rights to professional managers.  
 
Although the research of corporate governance and agency problem has been 
conducted in America and Europe for decades, scholars have given little attention to 
this issue in emerging economies until recently. The global privatization trend has 
directly and indirectly led to the emergence of increasing numbers of private 
corporations in many transitional economies. Additionally, many governments of 
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emerging markets launched reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and led these 
firms toward the form of so-called modern companies, which are very close to the 
organizational and management structure of firms in the West. Researchers looking at 
issues pertinent to these firms have grounded their work in the extensive studies on 
the topic of corporate governance completed in the context of developed economies 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Bulow & Rogoff, 1989). Despite this 
grounding, analogous research on transitional economies still remains relatively 
limited (Xu and Wang, 1997).  
 
Currently, increasing numbers of scholars are beginning to focus research efforts on 
China, as it is one of the largest and fastest growing markets in the world. Aside from 
the rapid growth of China and its continued integration into the world economy, its 
unique emerging institutional infrastructure provides substantial research 
opportunities to deepen our understanding of core issues in firm-level and corporate 
strategy (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Luo and Tan, 1997; Lins, 2002; Sun et al., 2002).  
 
I situate my study in the corporate governance and ownership structure literature 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), as China’s transition to a market 
economy has resulted in several ownership identities attaining a prominence not 
typically seen in Western European and North American firms. This emergence of 
unique ownership identities allows us to bridge research on the ownership 
concentration effect to the ownership identity effect. In developed economies, 
researchers have offered conflicting arguments on the relationship between ownership 
CHAPTER 1                                                                                INTRODUCTION 
 3 
concentration and a firm’s performance, including positive, negative and insignificant 
effects (Denis and Denis, 1994; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Leech and Leahy, 
1991; La Porta, et al., 1999). Scholars have also uncovered that different types 
(identities) of shareholders exert significantly different effects on corporate 
performance. A general finding, for example, is that state shareholdings tend to be 
inferior to private shareholdings and institutional shareholdings for promoting 
corporate performance, with limited exceptions (Shapiro and Willing, 1990; Prowse, 
1994; Hufft, 1998). 
 
In addition, I incorporate research on the ownership structure with that on a firm’s 
diversification strategy. Firm diversification is important because managers have 
considerable discretion and may not always follow optimal decision processes as 
based on the maximization of shareholders’ interests (Child, 1972; Hitt & Tyler, 
1989). There are various factors that will lead management to diversify, which also 
have distinct implications for firm performance. Scholars have contended that 
ownership structure, market forces, government intervention, management of external 
relations and skill building can each possibly become a motive for a firm to diversify 
(Tan & Li, 1996; Li & Tse, 1997; Li et al., 1998). The relationship between 
ownership structure and diversification strategy also has important implications for a 
firm’s performance (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990). 
Scholars argue that firms pursuing a related diversification strategy tend to 
outperform those following an unrelated diversification strategy (Zhao & Luo, 2002).  
 
CHAPTER 1                                                                                INTRODUCTION 
 4 
Given the above, I have derived several reasons as to why there are benefits to 
studying the mutual relationship between ownership structure, firm diversification 
and firm performance in China. 
(1) The listed companies in China are tremendously diversified. Based on 
Rumelt’s diversification scheme (Rumelt, 1974), I find that more than forty 
percent of Chinese listed companies fall into the category of Un-
related/Conglomerate (Table 6-11). This figure is rather eye-opening when I 
compare it to the historical levels of diversification in the United States and 
other developed countries (Rumelt, 1974). Consequently, I want to know 
under what circumstance companies have evolved into a diversified situation, 
what are the motivations for these companies to diversify, and what are the 
performance implications of their diversification strategies. 
(2) In China, there is a pervasive existence of state shareholding (Table 3-1). This 
is very different from the essential non-existence of state shareholding in 
developed countries such as the United States. I would like to study the 
different roles that state shareholding has played in influencing firms’ strategy 
and performance. 
(3) The transition of Chinese firms’ ownership has been rapid, as facilitated by the 
creation of legal person ownership. The emergence and existence of legal 
person shareholding is consistent with the transition stage of China’s 
economic situation and institutional environment. Legal person ownership 
functions as a bridge between state shareholding and private shareholding to 
CHAPTER 1                                                                                INTRODUCTION 
 5 
help smooth the economic transition of China. I want to study the role of such 
a temporary type of shareholding. 
(4) The diversification evolvement for Chinese listed companies is much more 
rapid than those companies in the United States. For Chinese listed companies, 
they either do not choose to diversify, or choose to diversify rapidly to a high 
level (see Chapter 6 for details). I would like to study whether the context 
matters— compared to developed countries, China is under a transition stage 
and its firms seem to be behaving differently from those in U.S. or Japan.  
 
1.2 Contribution 
In this thesis, I will identify several areas in which new research could be completed, 
to address issues and questions that remain unresolved in the existing literature. 
(1) Scholars have done quite an amount of research on diversification in emerging 
economies. However, there is still potential for research to improve our 
understanding of this phenomenon in developed countries and developing 
countries. The emerging phenomenon of diversification in developing 
countries heightens the need to identify the reasons for the emergence of this 
phenomenon (Why do the firms choose to diversify?) and its consequence 
(How does this strategy affect a firm’s performance?) It would be even more 
interesting to study the discrepancies of the effects of diversification between 
developed countries and developing countries, perhaps using an institutional 
economics approach. 
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(2) Studies on a firm’s ownership structure in emerging economies have produced 
ambivalent sets of results. However, few studies have linked these firms’ 
diversification strategy with the transition of a firms’ ownership structure. By 
linking the diversification strategy to ownership structure, I would hope to 
understand better the motivations, consequences and implications of firm 
diversification on firm performance from a new strategic perspective, which 
would link the macro effect (China’s institutional transition environment) and 
micro effect (firm ownership transition and diversification strategy) together. 
 
 (3) In this thesis, I develop an analysis of China’s listed firms’ diversification 
strategies that is consistent with Rumelt’s diversification classification. I find 
that China’s listed companies are undergoing a process of evolution during the 
period of 1991 to 2002, the details of which will be discussed in Chapter six. 
Additionally, I try to identify the factors that influence a firm’s strategy of 
diversification, such as institutional change, ownership structure, and so forth. 
 
(4) Using Rumelt’s classification which was built based on U.S. firms; I have 
found a different diversification trend of China’s firms. Compared to 
developed countries, China is under a transition stage and its firms are 
behaving differently from those in U.S. or Japan. This result should stimulate 
research on the implications of these trends for firm performance and other 
possible future evolution. 
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In my thesis, I try to answer the above questions. I will establish an empirical model 
to test the data on China’s listed companies, and try to make contributions in both 




My study has four major streams of findings. The first stream is about the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm diversification. I find that ownership 
concentration is negatively related to firm diversification. In addition, I find that state 
shareholding is also negatively related to firm diversification. Secondly, I find a 
positive relationship between China’s firms’ diversification and performance, which 
is against the conventional wisdom in the Western countries (Servaes, 1996). The 
third set of my findings is about the contingent  effect of ownership structure on the 
relationship between firm diversification and firm performance. I find that legal 
person moderates the relationship between firm diversification and firm performance 
(Figure 7-2). Here the moderating effect means that Legal Person Shareholding 
makes the slope of the inverted U-shape curve between firm diversification and firm 
performance more flat. Finally, I did not find significant performance gaps between 
firms of various diversification categories based on Rumelt’s scheme, but I find that 
Conglomerates and Single Business firms show much better performance than 
Dominant Unrelated firms. In addition, I find a general trend towards higher levels of 
firm diversification for all the China’s listed companies through the decade after the 
two stock markets were established. 





There are eight chapters in this thesis. The chapters are organized as follows. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a review of research on the relationships between ownership 
structure, diversification strategy and firm performance. Chapter 3 reviews the 
literature on the relationship between ownership structure, diversification strategy and 
firm performance in both emerging economies and China. In Chapter 4, I establish 
several hypotheses, which predict the relationships between ownership structure, a 
firm’s diversification strategy and firm performance in the China context. Chapter 5 
describes the data and the methodology I use to test the hypotheses. In Chapter 6, I 
introduce the definitions, concepts and methodology of Rumelt’s diversification 
scheme, with a specific description of how I used his classification scheme in the 
context of China. Chapter 7 provides the results of the empirical tests, which is based 
on the data described in the previous chapter. In chapter 8, I discuss the results and 
implications, and conclude the thesis with a discussion of its contributions and the 
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 CHAPTER 2  
 LITERATURE REVIEW  
  
This chapter provides a review of research on the mutual cross-relationships among 
ownership structure, diversification strategy and firm performance. There are five 
sections in this chapter. The first section reviews agency theory as the theoretical 
basis of my thesis. The second section covers studies concerned with the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance. Section three and section four 
introduce research on the antecedents and consequences of a firm’s diversification 
strategy. Each of the first four sections is composed of theoretical studies and 
empirical studies. Finally in section five I summarize my argument. 
  
2.1 Agency Problem 
 
In the study of the relationships between ownership structure, firm diversification 
strategy and firm performance, agency theory has been the foundation for most 
studies.  I first review work related to the agency problem.  
 
The agency theory was fully developed by Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
and Fama and Jensen (1983). Agency theory was developed on the assumption of 
economically rational human behavior and co-emerged with the separation of 
management and finance. In modern public corporations, shareholders have the right 
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to control and the right for dividend in return for the ownership. The owners of a firm, 
however, may lack the essential knowledge or expertise to manage the operations of a 
firm efficiently. Therefore, owners introduce professional managers to carry on the 
daily operations of the corporation. The owners need the managers’ expert and 
professional skills to effectively manage the firm and make profits. The managers 
need the owner’s funds to put his ability to good use. The agency problem comes out 
when the owners have difficulty assuring that their funds are not expropriated by the 
managers, such as being not used for the purpose of profit maximization (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). 
 
Managers with significant control rights over the allocation of investors’ funds may 
expropriate them. In general, managers can expropriate the investor’s funds in two 
ways: perquisite consumption and entrenchment. Perquisite consumption refers to the 
manager’s cost-enhancing activities to increase his non-salary income and other on-
the-job consumption (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). Entrenchment refers to the 
manager’s activities to entrench himself and ensure his management position in the 
cost of firm’s profitability (Walsh & Seward, 1990). The pyramid scheme is another 
good example of expropriation. A pyramid scheme is established by continuously 
joining people, who paid credits to those who joined earlier into the hierarchy and 
expect to obtain payments from those who joined afterward. In many pyramid 
schemes, the top management ends up absconding with the money. Managerial 
expropriation of funds can also take other forms than just taking the cash out. For 
example, managers may book the most luxurious hotel and enjoy the most expensive 
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flight during a business trip. Sometimes the above situations may result in poor 
consequences for shareholders. The owners of a firm must have a strategy to deal 
with these potential agency problems. 
 
Existing work suggests that agency problems can be resolved through several 
approaches. First, scholars have suggested that owners grant the manager a highly 
contingent, long term incentive contract ex ante to align his interests with those of 
investors. Just as Shleifer and Vishny argued, “in this way, incentive contracts can 
induce the manager to act in investors’ interest without encouraging blackmail, 
although such contracts may be expensive if the personal benefits of control are high 
and there is a lower bound on the manager’s compensation” (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). Incentive contracts can take a variety of forms, including share ownership, 
stock options, or a threat of dismissal if the firm’s performance is under the 
expectation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980).  
 
Second, the agency problem can be addressed by methods other than supervision. For 
example, people sometimes carry on the promise even if they are not forced to do so 
because they want to keep their reputation (Kreps, 1990). In a business world where 
information is highly circulated, a manager will have to behave himself for the future 
preparation if he wants to raise capital or abandon his occupation in favor of another. 
On the other side of the coin, it is also argued that reputation restriction may cause a 
backward recursion problem (Bulow & Rogoff, 1989). For example, when the future 
possible benefits for the manager is lower than what the manager is able to 
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expropria te from the current investor, rationally the manager may choose to cheat the 
firm owner.  
 
Third, agency problems can be solved through an effective principal monitoring of 
agents (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Zajac 
& Westphal, 1994). Shareholders can resort to legal protection for the purpose of 
supervision. One of the most important legal rights shareholders have is the right to 
vote. Shareholders have the legally protected right to vote for important strategic 
decisions of a firm such as merger and acquisition and the election of board directors 
(Manne, 1965). It should be noted that the effectiveness of voting rights depends on 
the legal environment. In countries where the legal enforcement is weak and the 
protection of minority shareholder is frail, managers may not be constrained or 
threatened that much. For example, in China it is requested that shareholder should be 
present on shareholder meeting to exercise the voting rights. Some managers or 
director candidates threatened the shareholders and compelled them not to go to the 
meeting (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
 
Scholars have also recognized that effective governance mechanisms, such as boards 
of directors (BODs), managerial labor markets, and takeover threats, can also be 
effective in resolving agency problems (Bhide, 1994; Franks & Mayer, 1993; Prowse, 
1994; Walsh & Seward, 1990). 
 
2.2 Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
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2.2.1 Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in Developed Countries 
Numerous studies have been done to explore the relationship between a firm’s 
ownership structure and its performance. Generally, scholars have studied the effect 
of ownership structure from two perspectives: ownership concentration and 
ownership identity. 
 
Many scholars fo llow Berle and Means’ (1932) hypotheses about widely dispersed 
ownership to further the research in the field of ownership concentration. For 
example, Shelifer and Vishny (1997) argued that ownership concentration has a two-
faced effect on corporate performance. On one hand, in a firm that has many owners 
of small shares of its equity and no owner of large shares, most owners cannot be 
involved in the ongoing management of the firm. Additionally, minority shareholders 
may be discouraged to keep monitoring the firm’s management by a free-rider 
problem: the free-rider can enjoy the benefits as long as other shareholders exercise 
the monitoring responsibility.  
 
On the other hand, there are several potential costs of having controlling shareholders 
in a firm such as inefficient expropriation of a firm’s assets by block-holders and the 
possible expropriation on minority shareholders. Not surprisingly, empirical studies 
about the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance have 
yielded conflicting results. While Berle and Means (1932) found an inverse 
relationship between ownership concentration and corporate performance, Demsetz 
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and Lehn (1985) used a 1976-1980 sample of 511 U.S. firms to find no relationship 
between the two. Denis and Denis (1995) also found a similar result of an 
insignificant relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance.  
 
In contrast, several other scholars have found a positive ownership concentration 
effect. Using a database of 470 U.K. firms, Leech and Leahy (1991) found that a 
company’s market value to sales ratio was greater for companies with concentrated 
ownership. La Porta, Lopez, and Shleifer (1999) examined the largest firms in 49 
countries and found a connection between higher concentration and higher corporate 
value. In addition, other scholars have found a non-monotonous relationship between 
shareholding concentration and a firm’s value. McConnell and Servaes (1990) found 
that Tobin’s Q increased with insider shareholdings to a point of 40 percent of total 
shares, and then began to decrease with increasing ownership concentration.  
 
Scholars also find that different kinds of shareholders could exert significantly 
different effects on corporate performance. Shapiro and Willing (1990) proposed that 
as government shareholdings have obligations to society such as social welfare and 
employment rates, they may pursue these goals at the expense of corporate 
profitability. In contrast, institutional investors have strong economic incentives and 
an information advantage to monitor management. However, Prowse (1994) 
suggested that institutional investors may be too myopic and only concentrated on 
short-term interests. Empirically, Hufft (1998) categorized 111 large U.S. firms into 
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manager-controlled, family-controlled and financial institution-controlled firms and 
found that family-controlled firms had the best performance. 
 
2.2.2 The Recent Trend of Privatization and Agency Problem in Emerging Economies 
Many countries in the world have experienced a shift from state socialism to 
capitalism during the recent decades. Governments are reported to have expended 
great efforts to privatize those un-profitable SOEs for the purpose that these 
corporations would perform better under private control. Actually, it is reported that 
more than 80 countries have launched ambitious efforts to privatize their state-owned 
enterprises. Since the 1980s, more than 2000 SOEs have been privatized around the 
world (Kikeri, Nellis & Shirley, 1992). The volume of privatization has increased in 
emerging economies from U.S. $8 billion in 1990 to U.S. $65 billion in 1997, and 
peaked to U.S. $ 100 billion in 1998 (OECD, 2001). As the privatization efforts in 
emerging economies result in the transfer of ownership from the state to private 
owners, it can thus create agency problems which are quite similar to that of the 
developed countries (Eisenhardt, 1989 Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 
2.2.3 Addressing the Agency Problem from the perspective of Ownership 
One important approach to control the agency problem is through the development of 
appropriate ownership structures (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; Walsh & Seward, 
1990). The level of ownership concentration and the identity of different types of 
ownership are two major aspects of ownership structure.  
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As to the concentration of ownership, researchers contend that high levels of 
ownership concentration can lead to effective monitoring and thus can reduce the 
agency problem (Berle & Means, 1932; Hill & Snell, 1989). Scholars have provided 
numerous explanations for the positive effects of concentrated ownership. Demsetz 
(1983) argues that concentrated owners have fewer costs to effectively monitor the 
managers than dispersed owners so that firms with concentrated ownership should 
outperform firms with distributed ownership. Boeker (1992) contends that as there are 
fewer owners with whom to coordinate, high ownership concentration is associated 
with lower coordination costs. Hill and Snell (1989) contended that concentrated 
owners have the power to demand information from management so that high 
ownership concentration can reduce information asymmetry between principals and 
agents. Specifically, investors with significant equity stakes can use their voting 
power or the threat to sell to monitor the management. Diffused ownership, however, 
leads to weak monitoring because it is associated with higher coordination costs and 
it has a more serious problem of information asymmetry (Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; 
Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Williamson, 1975). 
 
Owners can take numerous identities such as government shareholdings, institutional 
shareholdings, individual shareholdings, manager shares, employee shares and so on. 
As to the identity of ownership in most emerging economies, the majority of 
shareholders are confined to governments and local institutions (Xu & Wang, 1997). 
As to the government ownership, some scholars argue that in competitive markets 
without significant externalities, government ownership is inferior to private 
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ownership (Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny, 1996; Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001) This is 
generally explained by a government’s choice of social and political policy goals over 
profit maximization, a government’s unwillingness to lay off the employees to cut the 
cost (because of the consideration of unemployment rate), the government’s lack of 
expertise and high transaction cost due to bureaucracy (Aharoni, 1982; Boycko, 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1995; Majumdar, 1998). 
 
Several empirical studies support the proposition that government ownership is less 
efficient than private ownership. Boardman (1989) compared the performances of 
industrial state-owned enterprises, mixed enterprises, and private corporations among 
the 500 largest non-US industrial firms and indicated that state-owned enterprises 
performed substantially worse than similar private corporations. Megginson, Nash 
and Van Randenborgh (1994) compared the pre- and post-privatization financial and 
operating performance of 61 companies which experienced partial or full 
privatization in 18 countries and 32 industries during the period 1961 to 1990 and 
documentd strong performance improvements after privatization. In contrast, other 
studies also suggest that government ownership is not necessarily less efficient than 
private ownership. Caves and Christensen (1980) compare the postwar productivity 
performance of the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railroads and find no 
evidence of inferior performance by the government-owned railroad. Scholars have 
also found similar results in different contexts such as U.S., Japan and West Europe 
(Kay & Thompson, 1986; Wortzel & Wortzel, 1989; Martin & Parker, 1995; Kole & 
Mulherin, 1997) 
CHAPTER 2                                                                           LITERATURE REVIEW 
 18 
 
2.3 Antecedents of Diversification: Incentive 
 
Firm diversification is very important because managers have considerable 
discretions and may not always follow optimal decision processes based on the 
shareholders’ interest (Child, 1972; Hitt & Tyler, 1989). Here in my study I review 
some most important diversification incentives which have been extensively studied 
in the literature. I divide these incentives into two broad categories: external and 
internal incentives. External incentives include government policy and market failure. 
Internal incentives include uncertainty of future cash flows, managerial motives and 
ownership structure. 
 
2.3.1 External Incentives: Government Policy and Market Failure 
Government policy and market failure are the two important external incentives for a 
firm to diversify. Anti-trust and tax laws are among the government policies that can 
motivate a firm to diversify (Gilson, Scholes & Wolfson, 1988). For example, 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) reported that the merger wave of U.S. firms peaked 
in 1968 as anti-trust constraints on horizontal mergers had become much more 
stringent in the 1960s. Additiona lly, both shareholder taxation and corporate taxation 
can exert an effect on a firm’s diversification strategy. Auerbach and Reishus (1988) 
argue that in 1980s, dividends were taxed more heavily than ordinary personal 
income. As a result, shareholders may prefer that companies retain these funds for use 
in buying and building companies in high performance industries.   
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Williamson (1975) suggested that when the transaction cost is high, firms may have 
the incentive to create an efficient internal capital markets to avoid the external 
transactions. Firms tend to internalize the assets rather than to use contract for 
services when uncertainty exists and markets fail due to high transaction costs. 
Diversification may be a good approach to solve the problem of too-high transaction 
cost (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990). 
  
2.3.2 Internal Incentives 
Firms may acquire diversification strategy to avoid the uncertain future cash flow as 
suggested by Rumelt (1974) and Leontiades (1986). For example, firms in the so 
called ‘sunset industry’ such as textile and mechanical products must diversify to 
survive over the long run. Beatty and Zajac (1994) suggested that in 1990s the ‘No-
Smoking’ movement urged several tobacco and cigarette companies to diversify in 
order to avoid the possible uncertainty in the future.   
 
Managerial motives are always cited as a critical motivation of firm’s diversification 
strategy. Scholars contend that diversification may reduce the employment risks of 
top executives (Amihud & Lev, 1981). These theoretical arguments are largely based 
on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, scholars contend that corporate 
managers may diversify a firm to diversify their employment risk, as long as 
profitability does not suffer too much (Hoskisson & Turk, 1990). Managers’ concern 
about employment risk can motivate unrelated diversifications, which provides a 
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benefit to managers that shareholders do not enjoy (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia. 1989). 
Diversification and firm size are highly correlated, as are firm size and executive 
compensation (Dyl, 1988). Thus, diversification provides an avenue for increased 
compensation. 
 
Scholars argue that ownership structure can also be one of the important factors to 
urge a firm to diversify (Hoskisson & Turk, 1990). Hoskisson and Turk (1990) 
contend that firms with low concentration of ownership are susceptible to excessive 
diversification because diffuse owners may not monitor the management effectively. 
They argue that highly diffuse ownership encourages free riding on the monitoring 
efforts of larger shareholders because small shareholders’ potential losses may be 
small due to poor management so that rationally they would choose not to contribute 
any effort to supervising the management of the firm. Hill and Snell (1988) found that 
managerial ownership concentration is negatively related to the level of 
diversification. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) find that the level of diversification is 
negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of 
outside block-holders.  
 
 
2.4 Outcomes of Diversification: Performance 
 
There is a substantial body of literature that investigates the impact of diversification 
on the market valuation of firms. Lang and Stulz (1994), and Servaes (1996) find that 
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diversified US firms trade at discounts relative to single-product firms. Similar 
studies have been conducted by Berger and Ofek (1995), Khanna and Palepu (1996), 
Lins and Servaes (1998) for diversified firms in both developed and developing 
countries. 
 
As to the efficiency of diversified firms’ investment, several authors argue that 
diversified firms allocate their funds to less profitable segments. Shin and Stulz (1998) 
found that the investment by a business sector of a diversified firm depends on the 
cash flows of a firm’s other business sectors, but significantly less than on its own 
cash flow. They argue that the investment by business sectors of highly diversified 
firms is larger and less sensitive to their cash flow than the investment of comparable 
single-product firms. Scharfstein and Jeremy (1997) examines investment patterns 
across product areas in diversified firms and find that diversified firms seem to 
reallocate the resources inefficiently across business divisions and move funds from 
profitable firms in industries with high Q to sectors with low Q. Rajan, Servaes, and 
Zingales (1997) find that firms suffer from the discount in profitability caused by 
misallocation of funds through diversification. The extent of investment funds 
misallocation is positively related to the diversification level and the discount is 
positively related to the extent of misallocation.  
 
Empirical studies are abundant in this field. Lang and Stulz (1994) show that firm 
diversification and firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) are negative ly related 
throughout the 1980s in U.S. Further, they find that diversified firms have lower 
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Tobin’s Q than comparable portfolios of single business firms and firms that choose 
to diversify show worse performance relative to firms that do not. Berger and Ofek 
(1995) conclude that on average, when diversified firms are compared against 
matching portfolios of specialized firms they were valued less by 13 to 15 percent 
during the 1986 to 1991 period. Further, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) show 
that during the 1980s, managerial objectives may drive acquisitions that reduce 
bidding firms’ values. 
 
Stockey (1991) and Young (1993) argue that when firms diversify into new 
businesses, the diversification is related to a temporarily lower level of firm 
profitability as the firm is learning to use its new technology. Young (1995) studied 
the firm’s diversification strategy in the context of East Asia and found that as firms 
diversify into more unrelated businesses, they may need more time to adapt to the 
new technology. Empirically he found few firms could reach the profitable stage of 
learning due to several reasons such as the too eagerness of the local government to 
encourage the technology innovation. 
 
Scholars have also examined the internal capital market of diversified firms to 
explore the implication on performance. When external capital markets are more 
costly to use, firms allocate their capital internally through diversification 
(Williamson, 1971; Lamont, 1997; Stein, 1997). Fauver, Houston and Naranjo (1998) 
find that diversified firms perform better in most developing countries where the 
capital markets and the legal systems are less advanced. When the external financial 
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markets are weak or there exists market failure, diversification may be an effective 
strategy for firms to lower the transaction cost. 
 
2.5 Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in Asia 
 
Even with the extensive research on ownership structure and firm performance 
conducted in U.S., Japan, and West Europe (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; Walsh & 
Seward, 1990), scholars have turned their eyes to this issue in the Asian context 
(Singh et al., 2002). Compared to the U.S. and other developed countries that have 
mature and strong financial institutional environments, the environments of 
developing countries in Asia such as China, Malaysia and Thailand are characterized 
by a lack of financial infrastructure, underdeveloped banks and weak legal 
enforcement (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). This point is important as institutional 
environments will exert an influence on the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. For example, requirements for information 
disclosure and the protection of minority shareholders may influence manager’s and 
shareholder’s decisions on ownership structure and the monitoring relationship 
(Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). Thus, scholars working on ownership and performance 
issues in the Asian context expect to find new implications of ownership structure on 
firm performance, which is different from that in the developed countries.  
 
The existing literature documents that ownership concentration exerts an inverted U-
shaped impact on a firm’s performance in the context of developed countries 
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(Johnson et al., 2000; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Not surprisingly, scholars have 
also found this inverted U-shape effect to stand in emerging economies in East Asia 
countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea (Singh et al., 2002). However, 
they find that the inverted U-shape in East Asia is very different from the inverted U-
shape in developed countries in that the climbing and declining parts of the inverted 
U-shape curve in developing countries will be steeper (Singh et al., 2002). Singh et al 
(2002) explain these greater slopes by suggesting that the benefits of ownership 
concentration in developing countries will be greater because large shareholders are 
less constrained by internal and external control mechanisms so that they can more 
effectively monitor management to reduce agency problems. Yet the lack of control 
on block shareholders may also result in a greater cost of high ownership 
concentration because it is easier for them to appropriate the minority owners. 
Empirically scholars find that the steeper inverted U shape holds in Malaysia, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea (Singh et al., 2002). 
 
As to the other aspect of ownership structure, the literature suggests that the role of 
different ownership identity on firm performance is various. For example, 
institutional ownership outperforms family, corporate and government ownership 
(Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000) for firms in Europe. The ownership identities in Asia 
may be a little bit more unique and complicated. There is state ownership, 
institutional ownership, bank ownership, corporate ownership and family ownership 
(Singh et al., 2002). In China, there are even more unique ownership identities such 
as legal person shareholding and employee shareholding (Xu & Wang, 1997). Similar 
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to that in developed countries, scholars have also found that ownership identity does 
matter in its different implications on firm performance. For example, Singh et al 
(2002) found that bank ownership and state ownership is negatively associated with 
firm performance. In addition, the negative effect is enlarged in the developing 
economy environment as compared to developed countries. However, they also find 
that bank and state ownership exert a positive impact on firm’s performance when an 
economic shock occurs, which may be explained by the state’s and bank’s capability 




Agency theory is a basic theoretical frame of reference in the study of corporate 
governance. I began the survey by showing that financers need managers to better the 
operation of the firm. In the meanwhile, an agency problem may occur if managers 
expropriate funds (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency problem can be addressed 
by granting the manager a long term incentive contract, effective principal monitoring 
and a good design of ownership structure (Fama, 1980; Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  
 
As the privatization process goes on around the world, agency problems are not only 
confined to developed countries, they can extend to the transition economies in which 
firms that have a separation of ownership and control are beginning to emerge 
(Eisenhardt, 1989;Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). Considering the unique economic 
environment and institutional surrounding in emerging and transition countries, the 
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agency problem might show a different face and thus can not be effectively addressed 
given our current understanding of it (Walsh & Seward, 1990).  
 
As to the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance, the 
literature shows that high levels of ownership concentration is linked with better 
performance because it leads to effective monitoring and is associated with lower 
coordination costs (Hill & Snell, 1989; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1994). As to the 
identity of different shareholdings, empirical tests have shown conflicting results. 
Some scholars have found government ownership inferior to private ownership while 
others suggest that government ownership is not necessarily less efficient than private 
ownership (Martin & Parker, 1995; Kole & Mulherin, 1997; Xu & Wang, 1997).  
 
Diversification is considered as one of a firm’s most important strategies, which has 
critical implications on firm’s performance (Lang & Stulz, 1994). The existing 
literature indicates that a variety of factors may trigger a firm to diversify, such as 
government policy, high transaction costs and ownership structure (Ravenscraft & 
Scherer, 1987; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Morck et al., 1988).  A firm’s diversification 
strategy also has a weighted impact on its performance. Most of the existing studies 
have been done in the context of deve loped countries and most scholars have found a 
negative relationship between the extent of diversification and a firm’s performance 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1996; Lins & Servaes, 1998). 
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All the literatures I review in this chapter are done in the context of deve loped 
countries. As the topic of my thesis is for China’s listed companies, I expect different 
situation and environment in such a large emerging economy. I will discuss the 
economic environment and previous research about agency problems in China, 
Chinese firm’s ownership structure and diversification strategy in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
OWNERSHIP, DIVERSIFICATION AND FIRM 




In this chapter I discuss the relationship between ownership structure, diversification 
strategy and firm performance in the emerging economies and China. I first discuss 
the economic reforms that happened during the 1979-2002 period in China, especially 
the inception and development of China’s stock markets. Then I review studies on 
different types of Chinese firms’ strategies, which have important implications for 
firm performance. Next, I combine the literature on ownership structure, 
diversification strategy and firm performance in both emerging economies and China, 
with the goal of identifying limitations in the previous research. In the final section, I 
summarize the materials I revised and develop the propositions for my research. 
 
3.1 Economic Reforms in China 
 
3.1.1 The Transition of China’s Institutional Environment 
Institutions are ‘the rules of the game in a society or the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction’ (North, 1990: 3). An institutional environment means 
the legitimate social behavior accepted by the individual and organized ‘players’ 
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through the establishment of political, social and legal rules. According to North 
(1990), there are two general categories of constraints that make up the institutional 
framework: formal and informal constraints. Formal constraints include political rules, 
judicial decisions and economic contracts while informal constraints include ‘socially 
sanctioned norms of behavior’ (Scott, 1995), which relates more to the culture of a 
country and her people. 
 
Institutions have a critical impact on human behavior, and thus have an indispensable 
effect on a firm’s strategies, which are made by decision makers. By regarding a 
firm’s strategy as one choice out of numerous alternatives, scholars argue that 
institutions prompt a firm to make choices and constrain it from choosing others 
(Peng & Heath, 1996). However, scholars have not studied much about the 
relationship between firm strategy and institutional constraints in the previous 
decades as most of their studies are concentrated on Western enterprises and they take 
the market based institutional framework as granted (Peng, 2000). This situation is 
not changed until scholars have started the large amount of research in the context of 
emerging countries and transition economies. 
 
Recently more and more scholars have paid attention to firm’s strategy in Asia, 
especially the emerging economies in South and East Asia (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; 
Peng, 2000; Singh et al., 2003). Based on the previous study, scholars accept the 
conventional wisdom that firm’s strategy is mainly influenced by two factors: 
industrial effects (Porter, 1980) and firm-specific resource (Barney, 1991). By 
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stepping into the research toward a more advanced stage, scholars have found that 
institutional effect serves as another most important factor to influence a firm’s 
strategy making process, besides the commonly recognized factors mentioned above 
(Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). Scholars argue that there are significant 
institutional differences between emerging economies in Asia and the developed 
countries, which have already received extensive research emphasis. For example, 
scholars have reached a general consensus that the institutions of developed countries 
such as the United States, Japan and West Europe are characterized by a mature and 
strong financial infrastructure and severe internal/external monitoring mechanisms.  
Meanwhile, developing countries bear an under-developed financial market, low 
financial reporting requirements for listed firms and weak legal enforcement 
(Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; La Porta et al., 1999). Empirically, scholars have found 
that institutions do matter in influencing a firm’s strategy and thus have implications 
for a firm’s performance (Scott, 1995; Singh et al., 2002). 
 
One of the largest emerging economies in the world, China, is generally regarded as 
sharing common characteristics to other developing countries, such as economies in 
South East Asia: Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand; economies in Eastern Europe: 
Poland and Hungary; and economies in South America: Chile. These characteristics 
include under-developed strategic factor markets, poor communication and 
infrastructure development and a lack of property right-based legal system (Johnson 
et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999). However, China also has its unique characteristics 
compared to other emerging economies. Following North’s theory, I will explore the 
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uniqueness of China’s institution from two perspectives: formal and informal 
constraints. 
 
As with the political and judicial system, the legal environment is generally regarded 
as the formal constraints of an institution, China should be classified into the group of 
‘Soviet-type central planning regime and communist ideology’ (Kornai, 1992). 
Similar to the former Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization, China has built a huge highly centralized hierarchical system 
throughout the country and limits the private ownership to low levels. Probably 
because of this central planning history, in China scholars did not find many family 
business groups which have been found to play an important role in the economic 
development, as with the South East Asian economies such as Thailand, South Korea 
and Taiwan.  
 
Interestingly, all of these countries began an economic transition toward market 
economy in the 1980s and 1990s, but at different paces. The enterprises in these 
countries all face a changing environment as central planned enterprises are gradually 
substituted by a market-based orientation. These firms also are themselves under a 
change of ownership and management such as the transfer of ownership from the 
state to private sectors (Brus & Laski, 1989; Fischer & Gelb, 1991).  
 
Besides the similarities I described above, China has more disparities compared to the 
formerly centralized countries. China is pursuing a progressive transition strategy as 
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to its economic reform compared to the sudden change of East Europe countries 
(Butawoy & Krotov, 1992). China shows its uniqueness more in the informal 
constraints such as traditional culture. Personal relationship plays a vital role in the 
economic activities and human life in China (Peng, 1994). According to Peng (2002), 
China’s firms’ managers regard the connections with government officials and 
business partners (suppliers and customers) as the most important resource for the 
survival of a firm. This is a very common situation in economies in South East Asia 
such as Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan, which are characterized by a 
close connection between business and politics and certain levels of corruption and 
cronyism. This kind of relationship shows its more important effect as the substitute 
to the lack of legal system and acts as a hindrance to the construction of a strong legal 
enforcement and system (Child, 1994).  
 
Given this environment, scho lars have found different strategies for firms to diversify 
or grow in such a unique context. Peng and Heath (1996) find that firms in China tend 
to achieve growth through a network-based strategy, which is based on personal trust 
between firm managers. They argue that generally, firms grow through one of the 
three possible approaches: generic expansion, merger and acquisition and network-
based relationships such as strategic alliances, joint ventures and business groups. 
Considering the unique institutiona l environment of China, they argue that China 
lacks qualified managers to lead a firm towards generic expansion and China also 
lacks the mature financial and strategic factor markets to support mergers and 
acquisitions. As a result, firms may choose a network-based approach to grow by 
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forming alliances or groups, firms can avoid the difficult problem of ownership 
transfer in the under-development of financial institutions and reduce risks in a high 
transaction cost environment.  
 
Scholars have also considered the institutional effect in studying the diversification 
strategy of firms in China. Research on U.S. and U.K firms generally suggests a 
negative relationship between firm diversification and performance since 1970s 
(Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994). However, such a negative correlation is not found in China 
and scholars have even found large unrelated business groups to exist in China 
(Keister, 1998). This puzzle may be partly explained by the institutional effect. 
Following the framework I have described above, I will explore the institutional 
effect of China on firm’s diversification strategy from two perspectives: formal and 
informal constraints. 
 
Three formal constraints are prerequisite to support low transaction-cost business 
operations to a firm in a transition economy: a credible legal framework, a stable 
political structure and a well-developed and functioning market (Khanna & Palepu, 
1997). Scholars argue that China, as an emerging institution, is weak in all of the 
above three areas. Researchers have reached a consensus that China markets have 
developed faster than laws during the transition period (McMillan, 1996). Peng (2000) 
pointed out that during the transition of China; the government has gradually 
dismantled the central planning regime. However, the necessary formal constraints of 
a well-defined property rights based legal framework have been absent. The lack of 
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such a legal system might result in opportunistic behavior and high transaction cost. 
According to McMillan (1996), ‘In the early 1990s, China’s legal institutions remain 
essentially unreformed and ill-suited to the institutions of a market economy’ and thus 
‘property rights and contract rights are not well defined and reliably enforced. 
McMillan (1996) contended that ‘contracts in China have more of a sense of moral 
obligation than absolute rights’.   
 
China’s lack of legal framework is accompanied by a lack of stable political system 
(Peng, 2000). The political reform process of China lags far behind the pace of 
economic reform and met with a large setback in the incident of 1989. Such an 
uncertainty makes the economic participants more concerned about the connection to 
the government. For example, Chinese managers regard the state regulatory regime to 
be most influential and least predictable factor on firm performance from eight 
environmental effects (Tan & Litschert, 1994). As a result, managers will have to 
devote a great part of time and energy into the relationship with government officials. 
 
A market is ‘an institution which needs rules and customs in order to operate’ 
(McMillan, 1996). China is under-developed in its product market, capital market and 
labor market compared to the developed countries (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). 
Scholars argue that some parts of China lack communication and transportation 
infrastructure to support the economic development. Independent consumer 
organizations are scarce and government watchdogs are inefficient so that the 
inadequacy of information increases the transaction cost (Peng, 2000). Capital market 
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discipline is weak in China and capital allocation was seriously distorted (McMillan, 
1996). Compared to the mature market in U.S., China’s capital market is weak in that 
the financial report is not so reliable, the financial analysts community is non-existent 
and the independent financial press is rare (Peng, 2000). China also suffers from the 
lack of a mature labor market such as professional managers market. Johnson et al 
(2000) contended that China is facing a situation of inadequate trained and productive  
labor force and rare management talents.  
 
In sum, while China’ government has dismantled the central planning scheme 
gradually during the transition, it has not established the formal constraints which are 
necessary for low cost business activities. This situation will have great impact on 
Chinese firms’ strategies as a reaction to the institutional effect. According to North 
(1990), when the formal constraints of an institution are weak and fail to provide 
certainty, informal constraints will come into play to reduce the uncertainty and 
provide constancy to the organizations. In China, informal constraints rise to play the 
role in the following two aspects. 
 
First, the interpersonal connections among executives are the most important informal 
constraints (Peng, 2000). Child (1994) argues that managers in China ‘rely more 
heavily on the cultivation of personal relationships to cope with the exigencies of 
their situation’. Managers give presents and gifts to government officials or other 
superiors in order to maintain the long-term personal relationship and thus reduce the 
uncertainty and gain the information advantage (Xin & Pearce, 1996). China’s 
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managers report in a survey that the connections with officials are more important 
than ties with other managers in terms of the impact on firm performance (Peng & 
Luo, 1999).  
 
Another important informal constraints in China is the reputation of conglomerates 
which serves as a signaling device to reduce the uncertainty of consumers and 
investors (Peng, 2000). Under a market with high uncertainty and lack of law 
enforcement, the reputation of a conglomerate will help enhance the recognition from 
consumers and trust from business partners. Thus the member of a business group 
may have the advantage of getting familiarized by customers and gaining easier 
access to capital or foreign investment (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Specifically, 
conglomerates are able to perform some functions by themselves to compensate for 
the lack of formal institutions, such as capital allocation, information seeking and 
labor allocation (Peng, 2000). This advantage is more obvious when compared to the 
institution of developed countries characterized by strong legal enforcement and 
strategic functioning agents such as market research company, financial press and law 
firms. 
 
Overall, China is a market with high transaction costs and lack of formal constraints 
(Peng & Heath, 1996). Therefore, firms may rely more on the informal constraints I 
discussed above to avoid uncertainty and acquire constancy. The institutional aspect 
provides a rationale for firms in China to diversify and achieve good performance 
through diversification. Actually it is worth noting that scholars did not find a 
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negative relationship between diversification and firm performance in developed 
economies in the early era (Matsusaka, 1993). This strengthens my belief that 
institutional effect plays an indispensable role in China’s firm’s diversification 
strategy and thus the implication on firm performance. 
 
3.1.2 The Emergence of Stock Markets in China 
The economic system in China was highly centralized before 1978 when the central 
government launched its Open Policy. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the 
central government initiated large-scale economic reforms in 1978 (Qian, 1999). The 
reforms were aimed at moving the economy toward a greater decentralization of 
decision-making and an increased reliance on market forces.  
 
The development of China’s stock market is one of the most important elements of 
China’s reform of its financial system. In 1981, the central government began to issue 
treasury bonds to finance deficits. In 1986, the Shanghai branch of the People’s Bank 
of China set up the first over-the-counter (OTC) market in Shanghai. In 1987, 
Shenzhen Development Bank sold the first stock in Shenzhen market.  
 
In December 1990 and July 1991, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were established in China. By the end of 1991, 14 
companies were listed in the two stock exchanges. Since the stock exchanges were 
established, China’s stock markets have developed quite rapidly. Compared to the 14 
listed companies (8 on Shanghai Stock Exchange and 6 on Shenzhen Stock Exchange) 
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in 1991, 1287 companies (508 on SZSE and 779 on SHSE) had been listed on the two 
Stock Exchanges by the end of 2002. 
 
The fast development of China’s stock market serves as a window through which one 
can view the outcomes of economic reforms in the country and it provides scholars 
with a view on how to study China’s emerging economy. On the one hand, the 
number of listed companies and raised capital has increased rapidly since the 
establishment of the two stock markets in 1990, which is a sign to show that China’s 
economy is under fast development and increasing numbers of corporations are 
transiting into an advanced and modern form of firms. On the other hand, together 
with this transition, the potential problems that have been found in the West such as 
agency problems characterized by the separation of ownership and control have the 
potential to show more of its face in the economic activities in China. To study this 
dynamic phenomenon, scholars have been working on understanding China’s 
economy and its companies, which has also helped to enrich the classical theories 
about firms such as agency theory and transaction cost theory. Finally, it has 
enhanced people’s understanding on economic transition in emerging economies and 
China (Tan, 1996; Xu & Wang, 1997; Tian, 2002; Sun et al., 2002). 
 
3.1.3 The Ownership Structure of China’s Listed Companies 
A company in China may issue five different types of shares on either the Shanghai 
or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges: state shares, legal person shares, employee shares, A-
shares and B-shares. In addition, they may issue shares in Hong Kong and on 
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overseas exchanges. All shares of a listed company have the same voting rights and 
cash-flow rights, which means that one share is entitled to one vote. There is no 
cross- listing between the two exchanges (Xu & Wang, 1997).  
 
State shares are those held by the central government, local governments, or solely 
government-owned enterprises. The central and local government has the right to 
appoint the government officials as agency to exercise ownership rights on the state-
controlled firms. For most listed companies, the State is the largest shareholder. 
 
The legal person shares are shares owned by domestic institutions. There are various 
forms of legal person shareholders such as stock companies, non-bank financial 
institutions, and SOEs that have at least one non-state owner. Like State shares, legal 
person shares are not allowed to be circulated publicly or traded to either domestic or 
foreign individual investors. However, under the approval of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), legal person shares can be transferred to domestic 
corporations. 
 
Tradable A shares are owned by Chinese domestic individual residents or legal 
persons, but are not allowed to be owned by foreign investors. A-shares are the only 
type of tradable shares that can be publicly traded among domestic investors on 
SHSE and SZSE. Individuals are only allowed to hold no more than 0.5% of the total 
shares of any listed company. The CSRC requires that A-shares account for more 
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than 25% of total outstanding shares for a company when listed. The market price of 
a listed company refers to the price of A-shares (Xu & Wang, 1999). 
 
The employee shares and management shares are offered to workers and managers of 
a listed company, usually at a substantial discount. The employee shares only account 
for limited part of the total shareholdings of listed companies. Managers are not 
allowed to trade their shares on stock markets during their tenure. 
  
Initially B-shares are available exclusively to foreign investors and some authorized 
domestic securities firms. In 2001 the CSRS began to allow the domestic individuals 
to invest in B-Share. The B-share market is separated from the A-share market, with 
SHSE B-shares denominated in US dollar and SZSE B-shares in Hong Kong dollar. 
H-shares are issued and traded at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. At the SHSE, 56 
companies have offered B-share or a combination of the three foreign shares, and 34 
at the SZSE in 2002. 
 
A typically listed company in China stock markets (SHSE or SZSE) has a mixed 
ownership. Table 3-1 presents an overview of the percentages of the total shares in 
each of the different share classes across Chinese firms across 1993 to 2002. The 
table shows that the state, legal persons and domestic individual shares are the three 
predominant groups of shareholders. Each of the three holds about 30% of the total 
outstanding shares (Shanghai Securities Yearbook, 1993-2002). 
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The ownership structure of Chinese listed companies discussed above has led 
scholars to put an intense research focus on the three major types of shareholdings: 
State shareholding, Legal Person shareholding and Private shareholding (Tan, 1996; 
Xu & Wang, 1997; Tian, 2002; Sun et al., 2002). In addition, there are also some 
literatures that study other types of ownership such as town and village ownership 
(Jefferson et al, 1992). In this work about shareholdings in China, there are two basic 
streams: one stream to study the effect of ownership concentration, and the other 
stream to study the effect of divergent ownership identities. I will discuss the details 
of these two streams, below. 
 
3.2 Ownership Structure  
 
3.2.1 Ownership Concentration 
Prior research in China indicates that corporate governance has a significant impact 
on firm performance. The evidence compiled from research in China is in line with 
the suggestion that improving performance and creating value can be achieved by 
paying greater attention to ownership structure and concentration (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  
 
In this context, the effect of ownership distribution on firm performance and 
valuation has been the focus of extensive analysis in market economies. The existing 
literature documents a mixed effect between ownership concentration and ex-post 
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firm performance measures in developed economies (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Morck 
et al., 1988; Shliefer & Vishny, 1988).  
 
Empirically, many studies conducted in China also document conflicting results 
related to the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. 
Xu and Wang (1999) tested a pooled sample of all the China’s listed companies in 
1993, 1994 and 1995 and find a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm profitability. Lins (2002) tested across a sample of 1433 firms 
in 19 emerging economies including China and found that non-management control 
rights block-holdings are positively related to firm value. On the contrary, Chen and 
Gong (2000) stud ied the relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
performance for up to 128 listed firms on the Shenzhen Securities Exchange in China 
from 1992 to 1995 and did not find any correlation between the two.  
 
3.2.2 Ownership Identity 
Different ownership identities will exert various impacts on a firm’s performance 
(Tan, 2002). Scholars have done extensive work in examining the relationship 
between ownership identities and firm performance in the context of China (Wolfram, 
1998; Denis & Denis, 1995). 
 
There are primarily three groups of shareholders that can exert an influence on a 
firm’s performance— the state, legal persons and domestic individual investors. State 
shares are owned by the central or local government. A-shares are traded by domestic 
CHAPTER 3                         OWNERSHIP, DIVERSIFICATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN EMERGING ECONOMIES AND CHINA 
 43 
individual investors. Legal person shares refer to domestic institutions and denote 
legally constituted autonomous organizations including stock companies, non-bank 
financial institutions and SOEs, all of which have some non-state ownership structure.  
 
State shareholding is the most important ownership in Chinese large firms as a 
considerable proportion of firms have state ownership as their largest shareholdings 
(Berkman et al., 2002). Among the studies conducted on state shareholding, most 
scholars have reached a general consensus on its negative effect on a firm’s 
performance (Hussain & Jian, 1999; Morris et al., 2002).  
 
Scholars have provided a comprehensive set of explanations on state ownership’s 
negative impact, from theoretical to empirical, from static to dynamic. Theoretically, 
most scholars contend that government officials, who are the representatives of state, 
may not pay adequate attention to firm performance because they may be more 
occupied with political considerations (Shapiro & Willing, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1994); they may lack the essential expertise to effectively monitor and run a firm 
(Majumdar, 1998); they will have the political motivation to carry a heavy burden of 
excessive employees (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994); or the government agencies will 
remain less innovative and less risk taking for the consideration of their job security 
(Perkins, 1994).  
 
Empirically, scholars have conducted research using both static and dynamic 
perspectives. Using a static approach, scholars compare firms with different 
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ownerships (state-owned, collectively-owned and privately-owned) over the same 
period. Based on an analysis of a survey of 201 managers from four types of 
companies in China (state-owned, collectively-owned, privately-owned and foreign 
ventures), Tan (2002) contended that each ownership type exhibited a distinct 
environment-strategy configuration, which in turn had important performance 
implications for the firms. Other scholars used a dynamic approach to compare 
corporate performance before and after a firm was privatized, in which they found a 
firms’ performance to improve after privatization which supports the no tion of a state 
shareholding’s detrimental effect (Megginson et al., 1994). Additionally, scholars 
have also found non-monotonic relationship between government shareholding and 
firm performance for China’s listed companies (Tian, 2001). It means that scholars 
can not simply regard state ownership as having a purely unidirectional impact on 
firm’s performance. Rather, the institutional effects and contingency may play a large 
role in the relationship between state ownership and firm performance.  
 
Legal person shareholdings are controlled by local institutions other than the state. 
Compared to the state shareholder, legal person shareholders do not have to consider 
political objectives and thus can influence the firm in direction of profit maximization 
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 1999). Thus scholars expect that the legal person 
shareholder should play a positive role in monitoring a firm’s management 
(Wolfensohn, 1998). In a study of more than one hundred of China’s listed 
companies, Xu and Wang (1999) contend that a firm’s profitability is positively 
correlated with the proportion of legal person shares, but it is either negatively 
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correlated or uncorrelated with the fraction of state shares and A-shares. They also 
suggest that labor productivity tends to decline as the proportion of state shares 
increases.  
 
Private ownership is one of the three dominant shareholdings for China’s listed 
companies (Table 3-1). Scholars have analyzed and explained the performance of 
privately-owned enterprises from theoretical and empirical perspectives. The 
literature suggests that there exists a two-faced performance implication for privately-
owned enterprises. On the one hand, entrepreneurs of privately-owned enterprises do 
not have to be concerned about the principal-agent problem and thus are more self-
motivated to take a flexible strategy to maximize a firm’s profitability (Tan, 2001a). 
Nee (1992) contends that the chance of a private business to survive increases in such 
an emerging economy as China because there exists a great supply shortage of 
unfulfilled products. Additionally, privately-owned enterprises are constrained by a 
hard tight budget, which urges them to remain alert and proactive for the purpose of 
profit maximization (Boisot & Child, 1988, Perkins, 1994). On the other hand, 
privately-owned enterprises have many disadvantages in market competition 
compared to state-owned or collectively-owned enterprises: they are not favored by 
the banks or supported by the local government (Tan, 2001b), they have rather weak 
market power, poor distribution and supply networks and they face a heavy tax 
burden (Byrd & Lin, 1989), and they have relatively small market share and thus 
weak market power (Tan, 1996). In response to these competitive disadvantages, 
China’s private firms’ owners actively develop personal connections. Through a 
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survey on Chinese privately-owned enterprises’ executives, Xin and Pearce (1996) 
find that the executives of Chinese privately-owned enterprises regard business 
connections as essential for securing business opportunities and protection, Hence, 
executives in these companies rely on and trust business relationships to a much 
higher extent than their counterparts in developed countries. 
 
3.2.3 The difference between State Shareholding, Legal Person Shareholding and 
Individual Shareholding 
It is worth noting here that legal person ownership is an important and even necessary 
type of shareholding in China’s economic development. Like many transition 
economies such as Vietnam and Poland, in the late 1970s, China launched its 
economic reforms towards building a market-oriented economy. Rather than utilizing 
a big-bang or shock therapy to restructure the country’s economy, China’s 
government leaders have taken a progressive and step-by-step approach.  
 
Basically, the process of China’s economic reform can be divided into two periods. In 
the first period (1978-1993), the major task of the reform was to reduce government 
intervention and the bail-out of SOEs, to encourage profit-seeking incentives and 
competition, and to give enterprises relatively more discretionary decision-making 
power. In the second period (1994-present), the major task of the economic reform 
was to enhance the efficiency and profitability of SOEs through various ways such as 
privatization, restructuring and selling, and to build a market-based environment  
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through the development and improvement in areas such as legal enforcement and 
financial institutions (Qian, 1999).  
 
Legal person shareholding emerged towards the end of the first period, but its major 
importance resides mostly in the second period as it served as a bridge to transfer and 
re-structure state shareholdings. Even though the government wanted to reduce 
intervention and withdraw from corporate management to encourage the pursuit of 
efficiency objectives, state shareholdings could not be transferred directly to private 
shareholdings as the private sector did not have the capital to acquire large state 
shareholdings, and it was difficult to ensure the transparency and fairness of the 
transitions and avoid corruption. Further, the government could still retain control and 
residual claim rights on profitable state assets.  
 
In this sense, legal person shareholding offered a possible solution for the above 
dilemma so that the government could re-structure corporate ownership towards the 
form of private shareholdings yet retain government control in state assets.  Further it 
could transfer government shareholdings into legal person shareholdings in situations 
where it is either impossible or inappropriate to transfer the government 
shareholdings to private shareholding. Legal person shareholdings thus act as a 
temporary type of shareholding but a necessary one under the current stage of China’s 
economic reform.  
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Legal person shareholders are different from either holders of state shares or A-shares. 
The most basic distinction between legal person and state shareholders is that a legal 
person shareholder tends to be an economic entity with economic-related goals, while 
a state shareholder can be motivated by both political and economic goals. Legal 
person entities have hard budget requirements and have the relative freedom to decide 
the quantity of inputs and outputs in a firm’s production. Companies such as these do 
not obtain full financial support from the government, nor are they required to yield 
profits to the government. 
 
In contrast, state shareholders operate on a soft budget basis, and do not have 
sufficient freedom to manage a firm’s operation. In most situations, the production 
and strategic decisions of a company controlled by state shareholders are largely 
dependent on the government’s instructions. The government (whether local or 
central) is also responsible to subsidize losses, and the firm yields its profits to the 
government (Xu and Wang, 1999).  
 
Meanwhile, a legal person shareholder is somewhat different from an individual 
shareholder in that a legal person shareholding is not privately owned. Only a 
domestic Chinese institution is qualified to be a legal person, which excludes the 
possibility of an individual to be a legal person. In this respect, legal person is more 
like an institutional shareholder.  
 
3.3 Motives of Diversification 
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3.3.1 Diversification in Emerging Economies 
There has been extensive amount of research on diversification strategy in emerging 
economies. As Ghemawat and Khanna (1998: 35) note, ‘diversified business groups 
dominate the private sectors of most of the worlds’ economies’.  Business groups are 
common in developing countries (Leff, 1976) and scholars have explained the 
emergence of business group in developing economies from the following 
perspectives. 
 
First, scholars interpret the phenomenon of diversification in developing countries as 
being based on innovations in intra- firm organization in response to market 
imperfections (Leff, 1978). In an institutional environment that has high risks and 
uncertainties, an organization chose to diversify as an alternative to substitute the 
absence of markets. Many emerging markets bear the character of under developed 
markets with high transaction costs. ‘Under developed’ here refers to the weak 
enforcement of laws, the lack of well functioning financial institutions, and the 
absence of an efficient external capital market. Therefore, firms have the incentive to 
diversify so that they can internalize the transactions to avoid the high transaction 
cost from the external market. Secondly, the government plays a critical role in 
encouraging and supporting firms to diversify (Chang & Choi, 1988). For example, 
the South Korean government launched an export oriented development policy and 
encouraged the firms to diversify geographically and productively. Thirdly, a 
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diversified business group could have an advantage to share non-tradable assets and 
access to the bureaucracy (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998). 
 
Based on the above explanations, scholars have found a generally positive 
relationship between firm diversification and firm performance, which is contrasting 
to what they have found in developed countries. Palepu and Khanna (1996) compared 
the diversified business groups and non-business group affiliated companies in India 
and found that business group members out-performed non-members if the groups 
exceed a critical threshold. Chang and Choi (1988) analyzed the diversification 
strategy of Chaebol in Korea and found that business groups with a multi-divisional 
structure showed better performance than non-group members. China represents yet 
another case of diversification among its large firms, as resident in a transitional 
economy.  I will discuss the literature on diversification in China in the following 
section. 
 
3.3.2 Diversification in China 
With the transition from a planned economy to a market economy, drastic changes 
have been occurring in institutional contexts of China, and all types of firms find it 
necessary to make strategic choices in order to survive or defend their market 
position. It is a critical decision for a firm to choose among a wide array of strategic 
choices such as whether to diversify the firm’s production or not. For example, 
without the constraints of central planning, the Hong Kong branch of the Bank of 
China pursued a diversification strategy in the 1980s in order to increase its earnings 
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(Kraar, 1979). In recent years, various firms in China have conducted diversification 
experiments that have yielded mixed results. While focusing has become a 
fashionable strategy in market economies (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997), diversification is gaining momentum in transition economies such as 
China.  
 
Several scholars have conducted studies on Chinese firms’ diversification strategy. 
Tan and Li (1996) argue that ownership structure has an impact on the environment-
strategy configuration of China’s firms, which have important implications on a 
firm’s diversification strategy. Li and Tse (1997) propose that both market forces and 
the legacy of government planning and intervention are simultaneously influencing 
firms’ strategic decision of diversification. In addition, Li et al. (1998) suggest that 
two key factors— effective management of external relations and resource and skill 
building and utilization--may take effect in motivating firms to pursue a 
diversification strategy in a transition economy. 
 
3.4 Product Diversification, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
 
Scholars have attempted to explore empirically the appropriate relationship between a 
firm’s characteristic (such as ownership structure) and a firm’s strategy (such as 
diversification), and the impact of this relationship on firm performance. The 
literature suggests that the relationship and impact are context-specific, such as in 
China (Tan & Li, 1996; Tan & Litschert, 1994). Furthermore, studies set in the 
CHAPTER 3                         OWNERSHIP, DIVERSIFICATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN EMERGING ECONOMIES AND CHINA 
 52 
United Sates have also found that ownership is significantly related to various 
strategies, including diversification (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Hoskisson & 
Turk, 1990).  
 
In research set in China, with the exception of a few studies, the impact of the 
relationship between ownership structure and diversification strategy on a firm’s 
performance has only received limited attention. Zhao and Luo (2002) used a sample 
of 319 foreign subsidiaries in China, which was drawn from a national survey of 1000 
subsidiaries conducted and administrated by the State Statistical Bureau of China in 
1995, to find that subsidiaries pursuing a related diversification strategy with parents 
and perform better when firm performance is measured by sales growth and 
profitability than those with an unrelated diversification strategy. In addition, they 
find that majority ownership further facilitates the positive effect of related 
diversification on subsidiary performance.  
 
Luo (2002) analyzed data containing 134 international joint ventures (IJV) in China 
to explore how the product relatedness with either foreign or local parents affects 
performance of joint ventures. Based on an interview with the managers of those 
international joint ventures, he contends that the relatedness of an IJV’s products with 
that of its foreign and local parents is positively associated with its performance and 
that an IJV maintaining bilateral related diversification with both parents performs 
better than a venture maintaining a unilateral related linkage with one parent. The 
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relationship between product relatedness and  IJV performance is contingent on 




In this chapter I review the development of China’s economy and stock market in the 
most recent two decades. The China government initiated the economic reform in 
1978. As a critical part of economic reform, the stock market was established in 1991. 
Since then, more and more Chinese firms have successfully been listed, amounting to 
a total of 1287 firms by 2002. A company in China may issue different types of 
shares on the stock market: state shares, legal person shares, employee shares, A-
shares, B-shares and H-shares (Xu & Wang, 1997). State share, legal person share 
and A-share compose the majority of most listed firms’ shareholding. Hence, there 
are a number of possible identities for shareholders in China’s listed companies. 
 
Prior research shows that both ownership concentration and ownership identity have a 
significant impact on a firm’s performance in the China context. Studies conducted in 
China document conflicting results as to the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. Some researchers find a positive and significant 
correlation while others did not find any correlation between ownership concentration 
and firm performance (Xu & Wang, 1999; Lins, 2002; Chen & Gong, 2000). As to 
the identity of ownership, legal person share is found to be positively related to a 
firm’s profitability while state shares are negatively correlated with firm performance 
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(Xu & Wang, 1999). In addition, town and village enterprises that are dominantly 
controlled by private ownership are found to demonstrate higher efficiency than 
SOEs who are mostly owned by the government (Jefferson et al, 1992). 
 
To better understand and analyze the China market, I reviewed the strategies 
commonly used by different types of Chinese firms in the recent years. Scholars have 
argued that Chinese state firms’ managers are more averse to risk than managers of 
private or collective enterprises, especially when confronting complex and dynamic 
environments (Jefferson et al., 1992). On the other hand, privately-owned enterprises 
exhibit a stronger propensity for risk-taking, innovation and proactiveness in their 
investment decisions (Tan, 1996). Scholars also find that collectively-owned firms are 
more adaptive and innovative than state firms but less proactive and aggressive than 
private businesses (Jefferson et al., 1992). 
 
To summarize the above, I have reviewed the literature in the following fields: 
(1) Relationship between ownership structure and firm performance; 
(2) Relationship between diversification strategy and firm performance in 
developed countries and emerging economies;  
(3) The motives for a firm to diversify, including ownership structure; 
(4) All the above issues in the context of China; 
 
To summarize the literature on developed countries and developing countries, I 
document and compare the research result in Table 3-2. I have found discrepancies 
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between the research in developed countries and developing countries. For studies on 
ownership concentration, scholars have found a non-monotonic relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance in both developed and developing 
markets. However, the inverted U-shape relationship is much steeper in developing 
countries. For ownership identity, scholars found that government ownership is 
inferior to other types of ownership in both markets. For firm diversification, 
generally scholars have found a negative relationship between firm diversification 
and firm performance in developed countries. However, they found a positive 
relationship in developing countries. 
 
Based on this review, I identified several areas in which additional research could be 
completed, to address issues and questions that remain unresolved. 
(1) Scholars have done quite an amount of research on diversification in emerging 
economies. However, there is still potential for research to study 
diversification strategy in developed countries and developing countries. The 
emerging phenomenon of diversification in developing countries heightens the 
need to identify the reasons for the emergence of this phenomenon (Why do 
the firms choose to diversify?) and its consequence (How does this strategy 
affect a firm’s performance?)  
(2) Studies on a firm’s ownership structure in emerging economies have produced 
ambivalent sets of results. Further, few studies have linked these firms’ 
diversification strategy with the transition of a firms’ ownership structure. By 
linking diversification strategy to ownership structure, I hope to better 
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understand the motivations, consequences and implications of firm 
diversification on firm performance from a perspective that links the macro 
effect (China’s institutional transition environment) and micro effect (firm 
ownership transition and diversification strategy) together. 
 
The remainder of this research focuses on providing an examination and explanations 
for the issues mentioned above. I will explore the motives of firms to diversify in the 
context of China, and go on to investigate this strategy’s implication on firm 
performance. The next chapter outlines hypotheses as related to these questions, and 
as grounded in existing research in this field. 
 
 





In this chapter I establish several hypotheses, which predict the relationships between 
ownership structure, firm’s diversification strategy and firm performance. The 
predictions are grounded in the theoretical background and previous empirical results 
mentioned in chapter two. In developing these hypotheses, I also take into 
consideration the unique context of the China market, which was discussed in detail 
in chapter three. 
 
The first hypothesis predicts the relationship between ownership concentration and a 
firm’s diversification level. Hypotheses two and three investigate the relationship 
between ownership identity and diversification level. In these two hypotheses, the 
first one (H2) studies the relationship between state ownership and a firm’s 
diversification level and the latter one (H3) examines the effects of legal person 
shareholding on a firm’s diversification strategy. Hypothesis four predicts an inverted 
u-shape curvilinear relationship between a firm’s diversification level and its 
performance. Then, I explore the relationship between firm diversification and firm 
performance conditionally, such as under the condition of concentrated versus 
distributed ownership concentration (H5) and under the condition of majority state 
versus legal person shareholdings (H6). In the last part of this chapter, in hypothesis 
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seven, I integrate the performance implications of a firm’s diversification strategy 
into Rumelt’s diversification classification. 
 
4.1 Ownership Concentration and Diversification Strategy 
 
Many emerging economies, such as China, lack effective internal and external 
governance mechanisms that can reduce traditional principal-agent problems (Carlin 
& Aghion, 1996; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). In addition to these problems, many of 
these economies have an under-developed institutional infrastructure with a lack of 
property rights-based legal system that protects minority shareholders (La Porta, 
Lopez & Shleifer, 1999; Peng & Heath, 1996; Williamson, 1991).  
 
China, as one of the world’s largest emerging economies, also suffers from a lack of 
internal and external effective financial infrastructure. Scholars argue that managers 
of the firms in China (especially SOEs) have a strong incentive to diversify because 
they may have a feeling of power and prestige after diversification (Stulz, 1990), or a 
manager’s compensation is linked with firm size (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Tan & Li, 
1996). Further, diversification can make a manager more indispensable to a firm so 
that managers can ensure their positions through this approach (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1988).  
 
A firm’s diversification strategy may be more complicated if I take a firm’s 
ownership concentration into consideration. Coase (1937) argues that the agency 
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problem can be resolved through concentrated ownership. As the concentration of a 
firm’s ownership increases, the level of asymmetric information between 
management and large shareholders prevents the managers from exploit ing the firm 
for their own purposes (Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). Additionally, most of the listed 
companies in China are only partially privatized so that their ultimate ownership 
belongs to the state. Therefore, an interesting phenomenon is observed in China’s 
listed companies: managers have very low cash flow rights (ownership) while very 
high control (voting and decision rights) on the firm. The separation of cash flow 
rights and control can result in severe agency problems. For example, when the 
ownership concentration is at a low level, the management would have more power 
and freedom to participate in strategic decision making. Thus, top management teams 
will lack the basic incentive to enhance a firm’s performance and may be concerned 
more about the encroachment of the firms’ assets through various strategic decisions  
such as diversification when the ownership concentration is at a low level (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1999).  
 
Diversification strategy is one such important strategy because as I showed in the 
previous paragraph, when a firm has a low ownership concentration it is more 
susceptible to severe agency problems. There is a greater chance of expropriation. 
Diversification strategy is one feasible way for the management to increase their level 
of entrenchment. Most management teams of SOEs are appointed by the government 
or have a very close connection with the government. These managers might increase 
entrenchment activities to avoid organizational restructuring activities that may 
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displace them (Djankov, 1998). In addition, minority shareholders are even more 
likely to be exploited if managers use a pyramid ownership structures to advance their 
interests (Djankov, 1998). Hence, I expect to find a negative relationship between 
firm’s ownership concentration and its diversification level. 
 
Hypothesis 1 For China’s listed companies, there is a negative relationship between 
firm’s ownership concentration and diversification level. 
 
4.2 Ownership Identity and Diversification Strategy 
 
4.2.1 State Ownership 
Both China’s central government and local government hold a large portion of state-
owned shares in listed companies. State shareholdings are various and complicated. 
Shareholders in this category may be government agencies, government 
representatives, state-owned enterprises (SOE) and even legal persons who have a 
small property relationship with the government (Chen & Gong, 2000).  
 
A significant stream of research on state-owned organizations has demonstrated that 
the government is inefficient in monitoring firm performance (Aggarwal & Agmon, 
1990; Newbery, 1992). State ownership is argued to lack the basic incentive for 
closely tracking the performance of firms (Andrews & Dowling, 1998). Thus the 
previous literature has argued that governmental agencies will not be related to 
diversification strategy. Empirically, Ramaswamy et al., (2002) find no relationship 
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between state ownership and firm performance in India. 
 
This relationship  might hold as well in the China context. First of all, scholars have 
found that state ownership has been demonstrated to be ineffective in its monitoring 
role to enhance the performance of China’s listed companies (Xu & Wang, 1997). 
Additionally, as I have mentioned above, government ownership is heavily 
represented in most of the SOEs’ boards in China. Thus it is not surprising for 
managers to be greatly concerned about their relationship with government officials, 
as it becomes an issue of maintaining management positions (Chen, 1998).  
 
Therefore, the management of an SOE would have an incentive to expropriate the 
shareholders. Their incentive to expropriate depends on the degree of divergence 
between ownership and control (Claessens et al., 1999). As I discussed above, the 
situation in the Chinese listed companies is that managers have high control rights 
while they have low cashflow rights. In the case of an SOE, the divergence between 
low cashflow right of the management and high control rights is maximized. Thus, 
the incentive to expropriate by diversifying the company would be maximum when 
the state shareholding is distributed. However, as the state shareholding increases its 
stake, the divergence between cashflow rights and control rights would become 
smaller. Thus, the management would have less incentive and ability to expropriate 
so that the diversification level would be decreasing accordingly. Therefore, I raise 
the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2 For China’s listed companies, the proportion of state ownership will be 
negatively related to firm’s diversification. 
 
4.2.2 Legal Person Shareholdings 
Compared to the state shareholder, legal person shareholders do not have to consider 
political objectives and thus can influence the firm to move in the direction of profit 
maximization (Xu & Wang, 1999). Thus legal person shareholders are expected to 
play a positive role in monitoring the management. Legal person shareholders in 
China are not only motivated to pursue the goal of profit maximization; they also are 
better equipped than State owners with the power and ability to monitor a firm’s 
management (Tan, 2002). Unlike the representatives of state ownership who are 
appointed by the government, ‘representatives of legal person shareholders are 
elected to the board of directors and the supervisory committee’ (Sun et al., 2002). 
‘Legal person shareholders have access to corporate inside information, and the right 
to question chief officers at any time about operations of the firm’ (Xu & Wang, 
1997).  
 
Although legal person shareholders can provide effective monitoring of managers, 
when the concentration of legal person shareholding exceeds a moderate level, 
minority shareholders are exposed to expropriation problems because of weak 
governance and an under-developed institutional environment in China. Here the 
expropriation refers to the agency problem between block-holders (legal person) and 
minority shareholders. The literature has documented both theoretical arguments and 
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empirical findings in developed countries (Wolfensohn, 1998). Claessens et al. (1999) 
finds that financial institutions whose shareholdings in firms exceed a certain level 
disregard the interests of minority shareholders. In emerging economies, the ability to 
monitor a firms’ management with such an ownership structure is also in question 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1999). The existing literature shows that high information 
asymmetry exists in emerging economies, so that it may be more difficult to refrain 
the block-holders from pursuing their own interests in the cost of minority ones 
(Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988; David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998).  
 
Diversification strategy is an important strategy under such circumstances. When the 
ownership level controlled by legal person is relatively low, legal person shareholders 
are expected to effectively monitor the management and restrict the firm from over-
diversifying. However, as a legal person shareholder controls more ownership in a 
firm and becomes a block holder, the advantage of expropriating minority 
shareholders’ interest will outweigh the cost of over-diversification. In Southeast 
Asian countries such as Malaysia and Thailand, scholars find that controlling 
shareholders transferred resources out of firms for the  benefits of themselves (La 
Porta et al., 2002). La Porta et al (2002) named this type of transfer as tunneling. 
Tunneling might cause a seriously negative impact on firm performance. Small 
shareholders in China also face a similar situation as that of Southeast Asian countries. 
As they have disadvantages in information as compared to block-holders, they are 
vulnerable if block-holders want to expropriate assets and resources through 
tunneling, especially when the legal protections on the minority shareholders are 
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limited. At that time, if the management team also has the incentive to diversify for 
the consideration of their own interests as mentioned above, the two would align the 
interests and take steps for the firm to diversify. Thus I suggest the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3 For China’s listed companies, firm’s diversification will be first 
negatively and then positively related to the proportion of ownership controlled by 
legal person. 
 
4.3 Ownership Structure, Diversification Strategy and Firm Performance 
 
4.3.1 Diversification Strategy and Firm Performance 
The existing literature generally suggests that there are both advantages and 
disadvantages for firms to diversify. In the context of emerging economies, scholars 
have proposed different arguments upon this issue. In the first place, diversification 
can yield unique value and attractiveness in an emerging economy. In an imperfect 
and under-developed market such as China, focused firms face more difficulty than 
diversified firms to survive because bank loans are limited and diversified firms can 
obtain the necessary capital from other sources instead of external debt rather than 
single business firms (Denis et al., 1997). This situation is more problematic for firms 
in an emerging economy as minority shareholders are not protected well so that it can 
be rather difficult for firms to acquire capital from public sources (Berger & Ofek, 
1995). Additionally, the enforcement of law is weak and contracts can not ensure a 
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firm’s security. Diversified firms can turn to internal transactions to avoid this 
instability (Palich et al., 2000).  
 
As to the capital market, imperfections in external capital markets in China should 
make internal capital markets relatively more attractive for firms. Information 
asymmetries increase the cost of external funds over internal funds. Diversification 
allows firms to allocate the capital more efficiently using the internal capital market 
instead of the external capital market (Williamson, 1985). The headquarters of a 
diversified firm can move capital from business sectors that have high cash flows but 
poor investment opportunities to the sectors that have low cash flows but excellent 
investment opportunities (Stein, 1997). As most emerging markets suffer from a 
scarcity of well- trained people, firms can allocate the skilled talents more efficiently 
to the most needed position by diversification (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). All the 
above factors mentioned suggest that diversification may benefit a firm’s 
performance. 
 
When a firm’s diversification level reaches a certain point; however, a firm’s 
advantage from diversification can diminish and the problems can increase. Scholars 
argue that as firms continue to diversify, control costs and coordination costs can rise 
accordingly (Markides, 1992). Furthermore, generally speaking, related diversified 
firms can tap the benefits from diversification more easily than unrelated diversified 
firms to create value. Therefore, the literature suggested that related operations should 
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outperform unrelated operations (Singh & Montgomery, 1987). Thus there should 
exist an optimal point for firms to diversify. 
 
Palich et al. (2000) argue that the marginal costs of diversification increase rapidly as 
diversification hits a certain high level. Scholars contend that aspects such as 
distinctive competencies of strategy implementation may be critical for successful 
diversification. If the appropriate resources are lacking, diversification is unlikely to 
be successful and may result in poor performance (Berger & Ofek, 1995). Many 
emerging economies such as China lack vital resources such as skilled expertise and 
abundant capital to support the higher diversification of a firm. As a matter of fact, 
high levels of diversification require such resources as a support. In an environment 
where such resources are lacking, over-diversification is expected to deteriorate a 
firm’s performance. As a result, firm performance may suffer when a firm is found to 
have over-diversified and over-invested in unrelated business sectors. Thus, I expect 
to find an inverted-U shape relationship between firm’s diversification level and its 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 4 As a firm’s diversification level increases, its performance will first be 
positively and then be negatively related to its diversification. 
 
4.3.2 Ownership Concentration, Diversification Strategy and Firm Performance 
When a firm’s ownership concentration is low, it has many owners of small shares. In 
practice, these owners may not only be unable to participate in the ongo ing 
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management of the firm, but also have no enough incentive to monitor the 
management of the firm (Morck et al., 1988). A free-rider problem then emerges: 
small owners expect other shareholders to monitor the management and when every 
one has this similar expectation, no one exactly performs this necessary duty (Hill & 
Snell, 1989). Under such conditions, management will have a greater independent 
influence on a firm’s critical decisions and thus can exert substantial impacts on a 
firm’s strategies. Therefore, managers might increase entrenchment activities to resist 
organizational change, to make them more indispensable and to pursue individual 
interests (Stulz, 1990). Accordingly, shareholder’s interests and firm’s performance 
will deteriorate.  
 
When a firm’s ownership structure is concentrated, large block holders will have both 
the incentive and power to effectively monitor the firm’s management (Hill & Snell, 
1989). Compared to distributed shareholders, block-holders have lower coordination 
costs to execute their monitoring function because they have fewer owners to 
coordinate, they can use their voting power to require the management to reveal 
information and thus reduce the information asymmetry (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1994). 
In such an environment, if a firm’s management chooses to diversify, scholars 
contend that this reflects the shareholders’ interests (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). The 
shareholders may consider diversifying the firm because it is easier for the firm to 
raise capital (Palich et al., 2000), or because it can trade off employment and firm 
profitability by building an internal labor market (Djankov, 1998). In other cases, 
shareholders may be concerned about the insecurity of outside contracts and market 
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failure (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). In such a situation, diversification under effective 
monitoring conditions can enhance a firm’s performance.  
 
Therefore, before firm diversification reaches a moderate level, ownership 
concentration makes the marginal benefit of firm diversification increase while the 
marginal cost remains unchanged.  The net effect is that the marginal benefit of firm 
diversification becomes higher than marginal cost. 
 
However, when a firm’s ownership concentration reaches a certain level and results 
in the emergence of block-holders, the effectiveness of monitoring and thus the 
positive impact on a firm’s performance may be in question again. Like other 
emerging economies, China lacks effective internal and external governance 
mechanisms and there exists serious information asymmetry between large 
shareholders and minority shareholders (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). It is highly 
possible for large shareholders to disregard the interests of minority owners and 
expropriate them through various approaches such as excessive executive payment 
and price transferring (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The Asia Financial Crisis exposes 
that the controlling shareholders transferred resources out of firms for the benefits of 
themselves (La Porta et al., 2002). Such a condition may result in the adverse effect 
of managers and employees who will reduce their efforts for enhancing the firm’s 
profitability, and discourage minority shareholders to continue their investment 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Additionally, diversification is often used by block-
holders as a good way to transfer the resources to their own hands and expropriate 
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minority owners’ interests (Li et al., 1998). Thus, after firm diversification exceeds a 
certain level, ownership concentration makes the marginal cost of firm diversification 
increase while the marginal benefit remains unchanged. The net effect is that the 
marginal cost of firm diversification becomes higher than marginal cost. In this 
situation, I expect that under a relatively high ownership concentration level, the cost 
of agency problems and expropriation problems would outweigh the benefit of 
diversification and more importantly, diversification could be utilized as a tool to 
exacerbate this imbalance between majority and minority shareholders, therefore 
deteriorating firm’s performance. 
 
In summary, I contend that the ownership concentration would enhance the marginal 
benefit of diversification on firm performance before firm’s diversification reaches a 
moderate level. After a firm’s diversification exceeds a certain level, owne rship 
concentration would increase the marginal cost of diversification on firm performance. 
Therefore, I raise the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5 Ownership concentration would make firm diversification have a 
greater positive impact on firm performance up to moderate levels of diversification, 
after which it would make firm diversification have a greater negative impact on firm 
performance.   
 
4.3.3 Ownership Identity, Diversification Strategy and Firm Performance 
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In chapter two and chapter three, I have reviewed studies on ownership identity and 
firm performance conducted in the China context. The literature documents that 
ownership identity does have a critical impact on a firm’s performance and different 
category of shareholdings do have significant ly different effects when compared to 
each other (Berkman et al., 2002; Xu & Wang, 1997). For example, scholars have 
provided both theoretical and empirical arguments on state share’s inefficiency in 
enhancing firm’s performance (Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001). Therefore, when 
exploring the relationship between diversification strategy and firm performance, it 
may give me more insightful findings if I take the ownership identity into 
consideration. 
 
Diversification is a double-edged sword for a firm. In the previous chapters I have 
reviewed both the benefits and costs for a firm in a diversification strategy. 
Diversification can benefit the firm when there is effective monitoring of 
shareholders, especially in the emerging economies. Diversified firms can employ a 
number of mechanisms to create and exploit market power advantages (Caves & 
Christensen, 1980). Diversification can also provide a firm with different sources of 
capital other than external ones because it can provide an efficient internal capital 
market (Lang & Stulz, 1994). Diversified firms can shift capital between business 
sectors to achieve the efficiencies that are unavailable to single-business firms 
(Gertner et al., 1994). However, the costs of diversification under inefficient 
monitoring are also conspicuous. Without effective supervision, management team 
can entrench and expropriate through over-diversification. The lack of supporting 
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resources can deteriorate the firm performance when a firm is overly diversified 
(Palich et al., 2000). Thus, it is important to explore the relationship between 
diversification and firm performance on the condition of the effectiveness of 
shareholder’s monitoring, and under the type of shareholder. 
 
Among all the Chinese listed companies in 2002, almost one-third has state 
shareholding as the majority ownership (Table 3-1). State ownership has been 
criticized as being inefficient in monitoring firm’s management (Majumdar, 1998) 
and as contributing to corruption (Megginson et al., 1994). Thus the agency problem 
of a firm whose majority shareholding is controlled by the government is significantly 
worsened (Boycko et al., 1996). Government shareholders have neither enough 
incentive nor eligible expertise to effectively supervise management to pursue the 
profit maximization of the firm (Xu & Wang, 1997). Additionally, as one of the 
biggest emerging economies in the world, China’s capital market and financial 
infrastructure are far from well developed and personal connections play a critical 
role in a firm’s daily business operations, sometimes even more so than contracts. 
Both the establishment and enforcement of law are limited and the information 
asymmetry problem is severe between block shareholders and minority shareholders 
(Tan, 2002). Thus, like those in other emerging economies, firm managers of China’s 
SOEs, which are mostly owned by the Chinese government, have a high propensity 
and chance to entrench and expropriate (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). As mentioned 
above, a diversification strategy offers the management both an opportunity and an 
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excellent approach to pursue individual interests (Li et al., 1998). I expect these 
management entrenchment activities to lead to a loss in shareholder benefits. 
 
 As to China’s listed companies, the second largest group are those companies whose 
majority ownership is legal person shareholding (Table 3-1). Legal person 
shareholders do not have to consider the political objectives which confine the state 
shareholding from maximizing firm’s profit (Claessens et al., 1999). Additiona lly, as 
the representatives of legal person shareholders are elected to the board rather than 
appointed, they may have more incentive and capability to effectively monitor the 
firm’s management. The legal person shareholders face more stringent budget 
constraints so that they may concern more about a firm’s profitability and its financial 
condition (Wolfensohn, 1998). Furthermore, legal person shareholders tend to hold 
board meeting more frequently and more regularly to enforce direct monitoring on the 
management (Sun et al., 2002).  
 
Empirically, scholars have found legal person shareholding more efficient in 
monitoring the management than state ownership (Xu & Wang, 1997). As I have 
argued above, in an emerging economy such as China, with its underdeveloped 
capital and labor markets, shareholders may consider diversifying the firm to deal 
with the market failure of the external market and to allocate the capital more 
efficiently (Tan, 2001a). Through diversification, a firm can acquire capital other than 
by the issuance of external debt, it can allocate the labor force inside the firm more 
efficiently and it does not need to rely on contracts when the enforcement of law is 
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weak (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). All these considerations can bring benefits to a 
firm’s performance.  
 
In summary, both state shareholders and legal person shareholders use diversification 
as an important strategic tactic. The effectiveness of diversification on a firm’s 
performance is contingent on the monitoring role of shareholders. When the 
monitoring of shareholder is weak, such as it can be with state shareholders, 
diversification tends to result in the deterioration of a firm’s performance. However, 
when diversification is encouraged under the efficient monitoring of management, 
such as it can be with legal person ownership, it is likely to benefit rather than harm a 
firm’s performance. Thus I introduce the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 6a State shareholding would make firm diversification have a greater 
negative impact on firm performance as diversification increases. 
Hypothesis 6b Legal Person shareholding would make firm diversification have a 
greater positive impact on firm performance as diversification increases. 
 
4.4 Rumelt’s Classification 
 
In his book “Strategy, Structure, and Economic Performance”, Rumelt studied the 
evolution of large scale industrial enterprises in U.S. in the period 1949-1969. 
Following Wrigley (1970), Rumelt developed and expanded a systematic 
classification scheme to categorize 100 U.S. firms (drawn from Fortune 500) into 
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different diversification groups. I applied the same approach as used by Rumelt on 
China’s listed companies and classify them into different diversification categories to 
study the evolution patter of these firms, which will be discussed in details in chapter 
six.  
 
Using three measures (the Specialization Ratio, the Related Ratio and the Vertical 
Ratio), Rumelt defined six different categories of firms: Single Business, Dominant-
Vertical, Dominant-Unrelated, Dominant-Constrained/Linked, Related-
Constrained/Linked and Unrelated Business/Conglomerate. Following the same 
method, I classified China’s listed companies into these six different categories by 
calculating each firm’s diversification measures (the Specialization Ratio, the Related 
Ratio and the Vertical Ratio). The details of the calculation and classification 
procedure will be described in chapter six.  For the last set of hypotheses in this 
chapter, I establish my predictions about the performance implications for these 
classified companies. 
 
4.4.1 State-controlled Firms 
As mentioned above, I predict that state ownership is positively correlated with a 
firm’s diversification level from the perspective of agency problem, manager’s 
entrenchment incentive and the inefficient monitoring role of government ownership 
(Sun et al., 2002). Furthermore I predict that under the majority state shareholding, a 
firm’s performance is negatively correlated with firm’s diversification level. 
Researchers have pointed out that managers in SOEs have a high propensity, and 
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more importantly, the power to use various methods to entrench and expropriate 
because of the unique agency problem of state owned enterprises and the lack of 
incentive of state shareholding to supervise managers’ behaviors (Sun et al., 2002). 
Additionally, as an emerging market, China is reported to have an under-developed 
market of labor (Xu & Wang, 1999) and illiquid capital market (Khanna & Palepu, 
1997). Qualified managers are in supply as capital for venture capitalists. Single 
business firms stand out in such a circumstance as this form of firm provides the 
managers the least opportunity to entrench and adjust to the China market’s lack of 
human and capital resources. Thus I make the following prediction: 
 
Hypothesis 7a For the firms with the state ownership as majority, Single Business 
firms will show the best performance, followed by Related-Constrained firms. 
Unrelated Business firms will show the worst performance. 
 
4.4.2 Legal Person-Controlled Firms 
In the previous part of this chapter, I predict a u-shape curvilinear relationship 
between legal person shareholding and a firm’s diversification level. Additionally, I 
also predict a positive relationship between diversification level and firm performance 
when the legal person shareholding is dominant. I made the above hypotheses on the 
assumption that legal person shareholders are more effective in monitoring a firm’s 
management compared to state shareholders because they do not have to consider the 
political objectives and they are confined to more stringent budget constraints 
(Claessens et al., 1999). Furthermore, legal person shareholders may consider 
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diversifying the firm as a critical approach to enhance firm performance and their 
own interests because through diversification they can acquire capital other than the 
sole source of bank loans (Xu & Wang, 1997). This is especially helpful in the 
context of emerging economies where capital markets are far from fully-developed 
and financial institutions not mature (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). In addition, 
diversification can help firms to allocate labor more effectively and substitute 
external unreliable contracts with internal transaction when the law enforcement is 
weak and the problem of market failure is severe (Sun et al., 2002). On the contrary, 
if a firm remains in one or limited business sectors, it may face a significant number 
of disadvantages. For example, a single business firm has no access to investment 
other than external capital sources— debt and equity— which can make it more costly 
to raise capital than by internally generated funds, especially in emerging economies 
where the venture capitals and capital markets are not so active (Lang & Stulz, 1994). 
However, over-diversification may also raise problems. Without enough resources 
such as highly skillful expertise, financial regulations, basic infrastructures and highly 
liquid capital to support the firm, on-going diversification will result in deteriorated 
firm performance (David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998; Markides, 1992). Thus I expect 
that there exists an optimal level of diversification in legal person controlled firms. As 
to Rumelt’s classification which will be described in details in Chapter six, firms are 
categorized into different groups according to their diversification levels. Generally, 
firms with the lowest level of diversification are categorized into the Single Business 
sector and firms with the highest level of diversification are categorized into the 
Unrelated Business sector. The Related-Linked sector consists of those firms whose 
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diversification level is in between single business and unrelated business firms. I 
argue that the Related-Linked is the stage of diversification that is closest to an 
optimal level of diversification. Thus I raise the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7b For the firms with legal person shareholding as majority, Related-
Linked firms will perform best, followed by Unrelated business firms. Single Business 
firms will show the worst performance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the data I developed and will use for the hypotheses tests.  I 
also describe the econometric methodology used in the construction of the model. In 
the first part of this chapter, I will cover the details about the time range for this study, 
the sources for the data and the characteristics of the firms found in my sample. Next, 
I will describe the measures used in this research in the second part. Finally, I depict 




The original data sample is a pooled, cross-sectional database consisting of the 
revenue breakdowns and business sectors of all the China’s listed companies from 
1991 to 2002. I collected the data from several websites (www.sunsc.com.cn; 
www.sse.com.cn; www.sse.org.cn; www.cnlist.com), from which I could find the 
annual reports of every China’s listed company (Table 5-1). To ensure that I could 
obtain the maximum possible number of observations, I first created a list of all the 
codes of China’s listed companies from a software on China’s listed companies: 
Tinysoft (www.tinysoft.com). Next, I inserted these codes into a search engine of 
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those websites and found the information of the corresponding companies one by one. 
Although this method makes full advantage of internet sources, it raises the concern 
about the reliability of the data from those websites. To inspect the reliability of the 
data, I compared the data I compiled with other information sources such as the 
website of CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) and the websites of the 
listed companies. I also collected the accounting and stock market data of China’s 
listed companies from Bloomberg and DataStream. To make sure that I have the most 
reliable data I can possibly get, I also compared the above data with data obtained 
from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). After I downloaded the information for 
each listed company for all the available years from CSRC, Bloomberg, Datastream 
and TEJ, I created a unique code for each observation (list code plus year) in every 
data source. Then, I compared these codes in the list to the initial code list that I 
obtained from Tinysoft. This enabled me to combine the several different data 
sources by making an observation-to-observation comparison. For those with over-
lapping codes, I used the Tinysoft data as the benchmark and complimented the list 
by adding in those codes that were not available in Tinysoft. 
 
In these comparisons, I found that most of the data after 1997 are consistent across all 
the different data sources. However, the data before 1997 have the following 
problems: they are either inconsistent in different sources or missing in any of the 
database I mentioned above. Given these features of the data, I used several 
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guidelines to construct the database. First, I used the figures that were reported with 
consistency across the different data sources; secondly, if there were inconsistencies 
in data across sources, I used the data from annual reports; thirdly, where data at the 
business sector level were missing from all sources, I did not include that company in 
my analyses. Following these guidelines, my sample numbered 1208 companies and 
7043 observations, across the 1991 to 2002 period. 
 
I choose the time period to begin from 1991 because the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges were initiated in that year. The year 2002 is one for which I could 
obtain the most updated and complete information as available from public 
information sources about China’s listed companies. For each listed company in 
every fiscal year, I collected the following information:  
 
(1) All the business sectors in which a firm is active. For example, Shan Dong Dong-
E E-Jiao has businesses in plastic products, plastic materials, drugs, medicinal, 
biological products and surgical and medical instruments in year 2001 (Table 6-3).  
(2) The corresponding two, three and four digit SIC codes to the business sectors. For 
example, for Shan Dong Dong-E E-Jiao Co., Ltd, the different digit level SIC 
codes for one of its businesses, plastic products, are 30, 308 and 3089.  
(3) The revenue breakdowns for every business sectors in every year from 1991 to 
2002. Again if I take Shan Dong Dong-E E-Jiao as an example, in 2001, the 
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revenue percentage for plastic products is 84.6 percent. 
(4) For each company’s ownership structure, I collected all the information about 
types and percentages of a company’s top ten largest shareholders.  
(5) I collected the following information for each company in each year: total assets, 
total sales, total debt and total equity. 
 
I collected my data from various data sources. I composed the revenue breakdowns 
for a firm’s business sectors from each firm’s publicly-available annual reports from 
the websites I mentioned above. As this information is in Chinese, I translated the 
business activities into English and found the corresponding SIC codes for each 
sector. I derived the information on the top ten shareholders’ shareholdings and 
identities from these companies’ websites, their annual reports and websites of 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. I obtained the total assets/sales/debt/equity 
data of China’s listed companies during 1991 to 2002 from DataStream and 
Bloomberg as well as the website of CSRC (China Securities Regulatory 
Commission). 
 
5.1.1 Sample Description 
The listed companies in China in the data cover about ten broad industry categories 
(Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing, Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, 
Transportation & Public Utilities, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Finance, Insurance 
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& Real Estate, Services and Public Administration) and twenty-one sub-categories 
according to the SIC code standard.  
 
Table 5-2 documents the distribution of the sample firms in 2001 across industry 
categories on the 2-digit level of SIC code. From the table I find the distribution of 
China’s listed companies in different industries: More than half of the companies are 
doing business in a manufacturing industry (59.68 percent). The second largest group 
consists of those companies that operate in the wholesale and retail trading industry 
(10.75 percent), the transportation and public utility sector (10.14 percent), finance, 
insurance and real estate (6.48 percent), and general services (4.66 percent). Those 
companies in the agriculture, mining, construction, and public administration 
industries are comparatively rare in the whole group of listed companies. 
  
As to the ownership identity, the majority ownerships for China’s listed companies 
are state shares, legal person shares and A-shares. For the state shares, they are 
mostly represented in the industry of Construction (33.89 percent), Mining (32.71 
percent) and Agriculture (30.72 percent). However, legal person shares are mostly 
represented in Services (36.08 percent), Mining (35.24 percent), Public 
Administration (35.21 percent) and Manufacturing (31.02 percent). This may reflect 
the different emphasis of state shareholdings and legal person shareholdings put on 
the different industries. Another possible explanation is that the central and local 
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government pays special attention on some industries such as mining and agriculture, 
which are not allowed to be controlled by other forms of shareholdings. Apart from 
the previous two ownership identities, A-share has its most weight in Wholesale and 
Retail Trade (41.06 percent), Public Administration (38.87 percent) and Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate (37.44 percent). As A-shares are all tradable, it shows that 
the liquidity of shares is the highest among these three industries. Another interesting 
finding is that B-share gets its highest percentage in the industry of Service (7.16 
percent).  
 
Table 5-3 documents the evolution trend of China’s listed companies’ ownership 
structure from 1991 to 2002. I selected four years (1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001) out of 
this period to trace a general trend. By looking at the trend of the selected four years, 
I find the following evolution pattern. State shares seem to continually decrease in all 
the listed companies on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets. During the nine years, 
the average stock held by state shareholders has decreased from 46.35 percent in 1992 
to 33.27 percent in 2001. The decreasing rate is about 28.22 percent and 3.13 percent 
per year. The legal person shareholding, on the contrary, is showing a steady trend of 
neither increase nor decrease. Another big increase occurs in the A-shares, which 
rises from 11.57 percent in 1992 to 32.84 percent in 2001, accounting for 183.83 
percent of rise in nine years. Take a more detailed look, I find that besides the shrink 
in state shareholding, the percent increase of A-shares also come from the reduction 
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in B-shares (from 7.88 percent in 1992 to 3.29 percent in 2001). On the whole, the 
tradable shares are increasing (from 25.65 percent in 1992 to 41.44 percent in 2001) 
even though the increase is vo latile. However, the non-tradable shares in all are 
decreasing bit by bit (from 74.34 percent in 1992 to 59.36 percent in 2001). 
 
Table 5-4 describes the ownership concentration for China’s listed companies in 2002. 
In general, the ownership of China’s listed companies is highly concentrated. On 
average, close to half (43.47 percent) of the shareholdings are controlled in the hand 
of the largest shareholder. Additionally, more than half (58.51 percent) of the 




5.2.1 Dependent Variables 
In my thesis I will develop two sets of measures for the dependent variables. One set 
will measure the performance of a firm and the other will measure the diversification 
level of a firm. 
 
As to the performance of a firm, I use ROA (return on assets) as one important 
measure. I calculate ROA as the ratio of net income to total assets, which is an 
effective measure of firm’s ability to generate profits based on its assets. Many 
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scholars have used ROA as the measure of performance in the previous research 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Denis & Denis, 1994). This accounting based measure has 
its unique attractiveness. For example, unlike stock market returns, ROA is not 
affected by the divergence between shareholders and managers (Prowse, 1992). 
Additionally, it is easier to compare the results of my study to the previous similar 
studies because of the wide use of ROA as a measure of performance. ROE, which is 
defined as the ratio of return to equity, is another frequently used measure of firm 
performance. However, ROE is not used so commonly in the study of China’s listed 
companies. The equity structure of China’s listed companies is so complicated (it has 
state, legal person, individual, employee and foreign shares and the delineation 
between public and private ownership is obscure) that it may arouse much confusion 
when scholars are defining which equity to use in the formula. In addition, it is not 
convenient to compare horizontally between different ROEs of different studies if the 
definition of equity is in question. ROS, the ratio of return to sales, is another not so 
frequently used measure of performance. Compared to ROA or ROE, however, ROS 
has its obvious disadvantage that it does not reflect the firm’s performance so 
accurately as ROA/ROE and it is more a measure of earning rate of sales. Therefore, I 
use ROA as the sole accounting based measure of performance in my study. 
 
However, ROA also has its limitations even though it has been widely used by 
researchers. It is possible that management can manipulate the accounting reports of a 
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firm, especially in an emerging economy such as China because of the weak legal 
enforcement and low requirement of information exposure. Accounting returns 
include depreciation and inventory costs and thus may bias the accuracy of 
performance measurement. Therefore, scholars also seek measures other than 
accounting-based figures to measure performance.  
 
One alternative, Tobin’s Q, a market based measure, is widely used in the existing 
literature. Tobin’s Q combines capital market data with accounting data and 
implicitly minimizes distortions due to tax laws, accounting conventions and 
industry-related biases (Prowse, 1992). I use Tobin’s Q in my study as the other 
measure of firm performance. I define Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the sum of the market 
value of equity and the book value of liabilities to the replacement value of a firm. As 
it is very difficult to estimate the replacement value of a firm for China’s listed 
companies, I substitute it with the book value of total assets.  
 
In summary, I calculate ROA and Tobin’s Q in the following ways: 
ROA= Net Income/Total Assets; 
Tobin’s Q= (Market value of equity + Book value of debts)/Book value of assets. 
 
Another important measure I develop is that for the analysis of a firm’s 
diversification. According to the existing literature, scholars generally use two 
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different groups of values for the measurement of diversification. The first group 
includes two popularly used indices: herfindahl and entropy (Lubatkin, Merchant & 
Srinivasan, 1993; Amit & Livnat, 1988; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989). The 
herfindahl and entropy measures are both based on SIC codes and have been widely 
used recently in the research of diversification. I develop both indices. Using the 
information on revenues by product category for China’s listed companies, I calculate 
the indices in the following manner:  
Herfindahl indices for the year t: 
Hr_t = 1-? (Pi)2; (Pi refers to the revenue percentage of the ith business sector) 
 
Entropy indices for the year t: 
Er_t = ?Pi*log(1/Pi); 
 
The values of indices vary from zero to some figure above one. When the index is 
equal to zero, it means that a firm has not diversified at all, or the firm has only one 
single business. The greater the value of the index, the greater the diversification level 
of a firm.  
 
The other group of value to measure the firm’s diversification level is called the 
concentric ratio. The concentric ratio was originally developed by Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt (Foss, 1997, Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988). It is calculated as CR_t = 






*å  for year t, where Pi and Pj are the revenue percentages of a firm’s 
different business sectors and dij takes a value of zero if i and j are four-digit products 
within the same three-digit industry, one if they are in different three-digit industries 
but the same two-digit industry, and two if they are in different two-digit industries. 
 
5.2.2 Independent Variables 
In chapter four, I established the hypotheses for this thesis. The hypotheses predict 
the relationships between ownership structure, diversification strategy and firm 
performance. Firm performance is an exogenous variable; it is always predicted to be 
dependent on other factors. Meanwhile, diversification is an endogenous variable: it 
is used as an independent variable in some of the hypotheses but as a dependent 
variable in others. Ownership structure is regarded as an independent variable that 
influences diversification and performance. There are two important aspects that I 
measure to describe a firm’s ownership structure: ownership concentration and 
ownership identity. 
 
I used the percentage of the shareholdings of the top five and top ten largest 
shareholders as the measure of firm’s ownership concentration. These two measures 
have been widely used in the previous researches (Claessens et al., 1999). In addition, 
I calculated the herfindahl concentration index to measure the firm’s ownership 
concentration level. I defined the herfindahl concentration index as the sum of 
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squared percentages of shareholdings held by the top five largest shareholders. A high 
herfindahl index means that a firm’s ownership is relatively concentrated in its largest 
shareholders while a low index means that a firm’s ownership is distributed. 
 
Herf5=O12+O22+O32+O42+O52 (Oi refers to the shareholding of ith largest 
shareholder); 
 
In the hypotheses I raised the issue of two types of shareholders: state shareholder and 
legal person shareholder. Thus I define a measure to represent each one. 
State_t: the percentage of shareholding held by the State in year t; 
Legal_t: the percentage of shareholding held by Legal Person in year t. 
 
5.2.3 Control Variables 
I included a variety of control variables in my model. Following the previous 
literature on China’s listed companies, the control variables in my study include: firm 
size, capital structure, firm age, IPO age, stock exchange, industrial sectors and year 
of observation.  
 
Firm size is an important factor which may exert critical impact on firm’s 
performance. Fama and French (1995) found that larger firms are correlated with 
better market performance. It should not be surprising to find larger firms associated 
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with better performance because larger firms may take the advantage of economies of 
scale and formalization of manufacturing procedure. Larger firms may also have 
more talented management members and have more access to external capital 
because banks would regard them as a much safer debtor. Thus scholars argue that 
firms with larger size may generate more profit and are more capable while handling 
with the risks in the daily operation. However, other scholars pointed out that large 
size may exert a negative effect on firm performance. For example, large firms have 
much higher management costs and coordination costs, which may hurt the firm a lot 
without effective controlling. This problem may be more severe in China because 
large firms have to consider the social responsibility and not to lay off too many 
employees under the pressure of the government. Thus, it is necessary to consider 
firm size as a control variable in the study. In my thesis I use firm’s assets and firm’s 
sales as the measures of firm size. 
 
Another important control variable is capital structure. Like firm size, capital 
structure is also found to be significantly correlated with firm’s performance measure 
such as ROA (Shama, 1995). I define a firm’s capital structure as the ratio of debt to 
equity in my study. 
 
The age of a firm is an important determinant of performance. Those firms with older 
age may be more experienced in the major business, may have more implicit 
CHAPTER 5                                                        DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 91 
management knack and more long-term business relationships with their partners. On 
the other side of the coin, aged firms may have more inertia to discourage 
technological and strategic innovation and may be more bureaucratic and much more 
obtuse reacting to the environmental change. In my study, I use the year of a firm 
from its establishment till now (2001) as well as the year of a firm from when it had 
initial public offering (IPO) till now (2001) as the proxy of firm’s age. 
 
Many scholars have been involved in a dispute on whether the market or the firm 
strategy exerts a more important role on firm’s performance (Schmalansee, 1985; 
Rumelt, 1991). The existing literature shows that industry effects may be determinant 
of firm’s market value under some conditions and may account for the majority of 
explained variance of Tobin’s Q (Schmalansee, 1985). This effect may be more 
evident in China’s context. For example, some of China’s industries such as 
petroleum, banking, telecommunication and electric power are still under high 
supervision of central government and limited numbers of firms have the authority to 
set foot there. Thus these firms may have the advantage of monopoly as not obtained 
by their peers. Sometimes the government may favor firms in the strategically 
important industries such as military and high-technology by subsidies or preferential 
tax treatment. To control the possible industry effect on firm’s performance, I 
introduced twenty dummy variables for the twenty one different industries. 
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Firms in China are allowed to choose to be listed either on Shanghai Stock Exchange 
or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Both the domestic and foreign floating capitals seem to 
favor the companies listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange more as they are by and 
large relatively small size joint ventures and less controlled by the state ownership. 
On the contrary, generally firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange tend to be more 
of government controlled and larger size firms, which would be much more difficult 
for investors to hold a substantial shareholding. The difference may be a possible 
cause of firm’s distinct market valuations and thus performance. I use a dummy 
variable to control the geographic stock exchange effect. I have also considered the 
possible effect of years (10 dummy variables) and the effect of province (31 dummy 
variables). All the details of variables are listed in Table 5-5. The correlation matrix 




First of all, I will establish four separate equations and use both the random effect and 
fixed effect GLS estimators to test hypothesis one through hypothesis four. The main 
reason that I use GLS here is that my data are a time-series and pooled panel data. 
GLS would enable me to avoid bias in addressing the problem of over time 
correlation and heterogeneity. In practice, I used STATA to run the GLS test. The 
command I used in STATA is ‘XTREG’, with ‘RE’ as the parameter to run the 
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random effect test and ‘FE’ as the parameter to run the fixed effect test. The four 
equations are as follows: 
(1) DIV = a1 + a2*CON + B*CONTROL; 
      Here, DIV means the diversification measure. CON refers to the ownership 
concentration. I will use TOP1, TOP5, TOP10 and HERF5 to measure the ownership 
concentration respectively (Table 5-5). In addition, I will use three different 
diversification measures (Table 5-5) respectively to test this equation. B and 
CONTROL refer to two matrices of the estimator of control variables and control 
variables; 
(2) DIV = a1 + a2*STATE + B*CONTROL; DIV = a1 + a2* STATE + 
a3*STATE2 + B* CONTROL; 
(3) DIV = a1 + a2*LEGAL + B* CONTROL; DIV = a1 + a2*LEGAL + a3* 
LEGAL2 + B*CONTROL;  
(4) PER = a1 + a2*DIV + a3*DIV2 + B*CONTROL; 
      Here PER refers to the firm’s performance, which will be measured by ROA and 
Tobin’s Q. 
(5) As to hypotheses five and six, all the relationships to be tested are conditional, 
which means that I will test contingent relationships between ownership 
structure, diversification strategy and firm performance. As is shown by table 
5-5, I have four variables to measure the ownership concentration of a firm. 
As they have very high correlation between each two, I will use one of them 
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as a representative of ownership concentration. I will use the following 
equation to estimate the contingent effect of ownership concentration: 
PER = a1 + a2*DIV + a3*DIV2 + a4*CON + a5*CON*DIV + a6*CON*DIV2 
+ B*CONTROL; 
(6) Following the same logic of thinking, I will estimate the following equation to 
test hypothesis six: 
H6a: PER = a1 + a2*DIV + a3*DIV2 + a4*STATE + a5*STATE*DIV + 
a6*STATE*DIV2 + B*CONTROL; 
H6b: PER = a1 + a2*DIV + a3*DIV2 + a4*LEGAL + a5*LEGAL*DIV + 
a6*LEGAL*DIV2 + B*CONTROL; 
(7) As for hypothesis seven, I will first calculate the average performance of firms 
in every diversification category and then compare the means of these groups 
to see whether they have significantly different performances. Following the 
same logic, I define those firms whose state shareholding exceeds the average 
shareholding and tops the shareholders as the majority state shareholding. 
 
In this chapter I discussed the data source of my study, the variables I will use in the 
empirical tests and the econometric modeling techniques. I will discuss the empirical 
results and implications in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RUMELT’S CLASSIFICATION OF DIVERSIFICATION 
 
In this study, I followed the diversification schema developed by Rumelt (1974) to 
classify China’s listed companies into different groups. In this chapter, I introduce the 
definitions, concepts and methodology of Rumelt’s diversification schema, with a 
specific description of how I used his classification schema in the context of China. 
 
Rumelt used three measurements to classify a firm into a diversification category: the 
Specialization Ratio (SR), the Related Ratio (RR) and the Vertical Ratio (VR). A firm 
can be classified into a different diversification group based on the above measures. 
The different diversification categories are: single business, dominant-vertical, 
dominant-unrelated, dominant-constrained/linked, related-constrained/linked and 
unrelated business/conglomerate.  
 
6.1 Diversification Measure  
 
6.1.1 Specialization Ratio (SR) 
The Specialization Ratio is defined as the proportion of a firm’s revenues that can be 
attributed to its largest single business in a given year (Rumelt, 1974). For example, 
suppose a firm has the business sectors such as copper, lead and oil and gas, with the 
sales breakdown across these sectors at 59 percent, 20 percent, and 21 percent 
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respectively. Then I obtain the specialization ratio of this company as 0.59 because 
the sales from the sector of copper are the largest of all. Following Wrigley, Rumelt 
defines a specialization ratio of 0.70 as the dividing line between the Dominant, and 
the Related and Unrelated groups (Wrigley, 1970).  
 
6.1.2 Related Ratio (RR) 
The Related Ratio is defined as the proportion of a firm’s revenues attributable to its 
largest group of related businesses (Rumelt, 1974). For example, let us take a look at 
the North American Rockwell’s distribution of revenues by business area in 1969. 
Table 6-1 shows the detailed revenue breakdowns for different business sectors of 
North American Rockwell. North American Rockwell has two groups of business 
sectors which are related closely: (1) the businesses sectors related to aerospace 
systems and electronics; and (2) the business sectors related to industrial and auto 
parts. The former was the larger, in terms of revenue percentage, so that North 
American Rockwell’s related ratio for 1969 is taken to be 0.612. As Rumelt explains 
it: 
“The related ratio is particularly helpful, as this example demonstrates, in dealing 
with firms that are active in several unrelated areas, each of which is a diversified 
business in its own right. The related ratio in this case also minimizes the number 
of judgments that must be made in identifying whether businesses are related to 
one another” (Rumelt, 1974: 16). 
In this example, scholars may concern whether the textile machinery business and the 
graphic arts equipment business were related, or whether either, or both, was related 
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to the parts manufacturing business. However, after introducing the concept of the 
Related Ratio (RR), the confusion is clarified since the related ratio would remain at 
0.612. 
 
Rumelt set the dividing line between Related and Un-related firms to be a related 
ratio of 0.70. Actually the 70 percent cut-off was chosen by Wrigley because “it 
seemed to match fairly well with the judgments expressed by informed observers” 
(Wrigley, 1970).  
 
6.1.3 Vertical Ratio (VR) 
The Vertical Ratio (VR) in any given year is defined as the proportion of the firm’s 
revenues that arise from all by-products, intermediate products, and end products of a 
vertically integrated sequence of processing activities (Rumelt, 1974). I will provide 
an example of the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) to clarify this concept. 
The material flow and sales breakdown for 1969 of this company are shown in Figure 
6-1. As this company has a sort of vertically related business (mining, transport, 
refining, primary aluminum and fabrication), Rumelt define them as related. The 
vertical ratio is the sum of all the revenue percentages from these business sectors. 
That will be 0.96. 
 
6.2 Diversification Category 
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Rumelt has defined diversified firms into different categories. The basic four 
categories are: Single Business, Related Business (including linked-related and 
vertical-related businesses), Dominant Business and Conglomerates. I will describe 
the linked-related business, dominant business, vertical-related business and 
conglomerates in details in the following. 
 
6.2.1 Linked Relatedness 
There are two basic types of linked-related business firms: related-constrained and 
related-lined firms. Related-constrained firms are those whose business sectors stay 
relatively ‘close to home’, which means that each business was related to a firm’s 
other businesses and all businesses could be seen as radiating from a common core. 
Related- linked firms are those who have had added new activities to old activities in 
such a way that they were eventually active in businesses which, considered by 
themselves, were virtually unrelated.  
 
6.2.2 Dominant Business 
The Dominant Business category can be subdivided into Dominant-constrained and 
Dominant- linked categories, representing the same type of diversification pattern as 
the Related-constrained and Related- linked categories. The quantitative criteria for a 
company to be in the Dominant-Unrelated class were that its Specialization Ratio (SR) 
is at least equal to 0.70 (SR>=0.70) and that revenues received from activities 
unrelated to the largest group of related businesses be larger than revenues due to 
businesses related, but not including, the largest single business. The latter 
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requirement is equivalent to the inequality that the Related Ratio is less than the half 
of the sum of the Specialization Ratio and one (RR<1/2(SR+1)). 
 
6.2.3 Vertical Integration 
Vertically integrated firms possess ‘long- linked technologies’, as they often grow by 
absorbing their suppliers and industrial customers. As Rumelt points out, “the major 
activities of these companies consist of stages in the sequential processing of a 
particular material from its raw form to a finished product, or a variety of products”. 
As to the U.S. firms in 1960s and 1970s, Rumelt found most vertically- integrated 
firms in the oil, rubber, basic metals, and forest products industries (Rumelt, 1974).  
 
In principal, in the work of Wrigley and Rumelt, vertically integrated firms that had 
95 percent or more of their sales in a single end-product business were classed as 
Single Business. Those in which the sales of all intermediate and end products 
associated with the vertical chain comprised less than 70 percent of total revenues 
were treated as either Related or Un-related Businesses, depending on the related 
ratio. The rest, which were the majority, were placed in another subclass of Dominant 
Business firms, the Dominant-Vertical class. 
 
6.2.4 Conglomerates 
A Conglomerate is a company that has rapidly diversified into several unrelated areas 
by means of a relatively large number of mergers and acquisitions (Rumelt, 1974). 
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The quantitative criteria to distinguish a firm as an unrelated business firm is that its 
Related Ratio is smaller than 0.70 (RR<0.70). 
 
Although an acquisitive conglomerate is by definition an unrelated business firm, not 
all unrelated business firms are conglomerates. Rumelt has defined the following 
criteria for a firm to be a conglomerate: “(1) conglomerates have to have experienced 
an average growth rate in earnings per share of at least 10 percent per year; (2) 
conglomerates have to have made at least five acquisitions, three of which were 
diversification moves into new business areas unrelated to previous activities; and (3) 
conglomerates have to have issued new equity shares whose cumulative market value 
was greater than the cumulative value of dividends paid during the same period” 
(Rumelt, 1974). 
 
6.2.5 Summary of Diversification Categories 
Rumelt has defined four major categories of diversification strategy (Single Business, 
Related Business, Dominant Business and Unrelated Business). All but the Single 
Business category has been further divided into sub-categories. The heuristic used for 
assigning a firm to a category is indicated in the flow diagram outlined in Figure 6-2.  
Rumelt has described the definition and quantitative standard for the following 
different diversification categories1 (Rumelt, 1974): 
 
                                                 
1 Please note that the category description here is quoted from Rumelt (1974): 29-32. 
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(1) Single Business: firms that are basically committed to a single business. 
Single Business companies are those with specialization ratios of 0.95 or more. 
(2) Dominant Business: firms that have diversified to some extent but still obtain 
the preponderance of their revenues from a single business. Among non-
vertically integrated firms (VR<0.70), those with specialization ratios greater 
than or equal to 0.70 but less than 0.95 are Dominant Business firms. Among 
vertically integrated firms (VR>=0.70), those that do not qualify as Single 
Business companies fall into the Dominant category. 
(a) Dominant-Vertical: vertically integrated firms (VR>=0.7) that produce 
and sell a variety of end products, no one of which contributes more 
than 95 percent of total revenues; 
(b) Dominant-Constrained: non-vertical Dominant Business firms that 
have diversified by building on some particular strength, skills, or 
resource associated with the original dominant activity. In such firms 
the preponderance of the diversified activities are all related one to 
another and to the dominant business; 
(c) Dominant-Linked: non-vertical Dominant Business firms that have 
diversified by building on several different strengths, skills, or 
resources or by building on new strengths, skills, or resources as they 
are acquired. In such firms the preponderance of the diversified 
activities are not directly related to the dominant business but each is 
somehow related to some other of the firm’s activities; 
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(d) Dominant-Unrelated: non-vertical Dominant Business firms in which 
the preponderance of the diversified activities are unrelated to the 
dominant businesses. 
(3) Related Business: non-vertically integrated firms that are diversified, having 
specialization ratio less than 0.70, and in which diversification has been 
primarily accomplished by relating new activities to old, so that the related 
ratio is 0.70 or more. 
(a) Related-Constrained: Related Business firms that have diversified 
chiefly by relating new businesses to a specific central skill or resource 
and in which, therefore, each business activity is related to almost all 
of the other business activities; 
(b) Related-Linked: Related Business firms that have diversified by 
relating new businesses to some strength or skill already possessed, 
but not always the same strength or skill. By diversifying in several 
directions and exploiting new skills as they are acquired, such firms 
have become active in widely disparate businesses. 
(4) Unrelated Business: non-vertical firms that have diversified chiefly without 
regard to relationships between new businesses and current activities. Such 
firms are defined by a related ratio of less than 0.70. 
(a) Unrelated-Passive: Unrelated Business firms that do not qualify as 
Acquisitive Conglomerates; 
(b) Acquisitive Conglomerates: Unrelated Business firms that have 
aggressive programs for the acquisition of new unrelated businesses.  
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6.3 Classification of China’s Listed Companies 
 
In our database, there were 1,186 companies listed on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 2002. I classified China’s listed companies into 
diversification categories according to Rumelt’s diversification criteria. To make the 
classification, I used data describing the revenue breakdowns for each of China’s 
listed companies from 1991, when China’s stock markets were initialized, to 2002, 
the most recent fiscal year for which I had the complete data. However, as I have very 
few during the early stages of China’s stock markets (1991-1994), I will do most of 
the analyses on the basis of the data from 1995 to 2002. The data on revenue 
breakdowns provides information on revenue by SIC (standard industrial 
classification) code for each company. With the help of the business sectors’ SIC 
codes, I am able to calculate a firm’s specialization ratio, related ratio and vertical 
ratio in each year.  
 
6.3.1 Specialization Ratio (SR) 
The specialization ratio is the proportion of a firm’s revenues that can be attributed to 
its largest single business in a given year. 
 
I calculated the specialization ratio for a listed China company on the basis of its 4-
digit SIC codes. I regarded business sectors with different 4-digit SIC codes as 
different single businesses. I identified the 4-digit SIC business that accounted for the 
CHAPTER 6                     RUMELT’S CLASSIFICATION OF DIVERSIFICATION 
 104 
largest percentage of a firm’s revenues. This proportion was a firm’s specialization 
ratio. An example will be provided later in this chapter in section 6.4.1 to make the 
calculation procedure clear. 
 
6.3.2 Related Ratio (RR) 
The related ratio is the proportion of a firm’s revenues attributable to its largest group 
of related businesses. As to the definition of ‘related’, I use the standard of SIC codes. 
I regarded two businesses as related if they shared the same 2-digit SIC codes.  For all 
businesses in the same 2-digit SIC code I cumulated revenues to determine the 
proportion of a firm’s revenues in related businesses. The 2-digit SIC code with the 
largest revenue is the proportion that is the related ratio. I will provide several 
examples later in section 6.4 for clarification. 
 
6.3.3 Vertical Ratio (VR) 
The Vertical Ratio (VR) in a given year is the proportion of the firm’s revenues that 
arise from all by-products, intermediate products, and end products of a vertically 
integrated sequence of processing activities (Rumelt, 1974). I used the following 
method to calculate a firm’s vertical ratio. 
 
First, I inspected a firm's 2-digit SIC codes to identify if a firm had a manufacturing 
business (SIC: 20-39). Second, if a firm does not have any business in manufacturing, 
I classified it into the non-vertically integrated category; otherwise, I checked if the 
firm had business in the wholesale trade (50 and 51), mining (10, 12, 13, 14) and 
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agriculture (01-09) sectors.  I then summarized the percentage of sales from the above 
industries to that of manufacturing industry and get the result of the vertical ratio.  
 
To align a vertically related chain of activities I did an examination of the 
manufacturing chain upward to the supplier (such as agriculture and mining) and 
downward to the customer (such as wholesale). The details to define whether two 
businesses are vertically related are listed in Table 6-2. The Vertical Ratio (VR) is 
calculated from the vertical chain with the largest sales percentage.  
 
Finally, after I calculated SR, RR and VR, I classified firms into one of the 
diversification groups following the heuristic outlined in Figure 6-2. 
 
6.4 Examples of Implementation of Coding Procedure  
 
In this section, I provide several examples to illustrate this classification process. 
 
6.4.1 Example One: Shan Dong Dong-E E-Jiao CO., Ltd 
First the first example, I use the company, Shan Dong Dong-E E-Jiao CO., Ltd. It is a 
listed company on Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Its revenue percentage breakdown in 
2001 is provided in Table 6-3.  
 
In this example, the Specialization Ratio can be obtained from the largest revenue 
proportion of a single business. In this case, the business ‘plastic products’ (SIC code 
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3089) accounts for the largest proportion (0.8460). Hence, the Specialization Ratio is 
0.8460.  
 
Next, I consider businesses with the same 2-digit SIC as related. I then sum the 
revenue proportions for businesses sharing the same 2-digit SIC code. The results are 
listed in Table 6-4. I can now compute the Related Ratio, as derived from the largest 
revenue proportion of a 2-digit business. Here it is 0.8460 from the businesses with 
SIC code 30. 
 
The calculation of the Vertical Ratio requires me to first identify if a firm’s business 
is in manufacturing, which is marked by 2-digit SIC codes in the range of 20 to 39. In 
this example, the company has businesses in SIC codes 30, 28 and 38; hence it is 
engaged in manufacturing. After summarizing the revenue percentages from the 
businesses mentioned above, I searched SIC codes to identify if there exists any 
vertical link between different business sectors, which requires me to search for the 
manufacturing SIC codes one by one according to the criteria of table 6-2. First, for 
the SIC code as 30; I will search for whether there are any businesses that fall into the 
category of SIC code 516. Next, for the SIC code of 28, I will search for businesses 
with the SIC code of 512. The same rationale guides the search for 508 as vertically 
related to 38.  
 
In my search, I found that there are business sectors with the SIC code of 516, which 
is vertically related to 30, and 512 which is vertically related to 28. Hence I obtain 
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two Vertical Ratios for this company: the first is 0.8880 (0.8460 from 30 plus 0.0420 
from 516) and the second is 0.1107 (0.0923 from 28 plus 0.0184 from 512). I take the 
larger one (0.8880) as this firm’s Vertical Ratio. According to the approach explained 
in Figure 6-2, I classify this firm into the category of Dominant-Vertical. By 
calculating as mentioned above, I obtain the result in Table 6-5. 
 
6.4.2 Example Two: Gezhouba CO., Ltd 
The second example utilizes Gezhouba Co., Ltd, which is listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange. The details of its revenue percentage breakdown in 1999 are listed 
in Table 6-6. 
 
The firm’s Specialization Ratio is 0.8382 (Table 6-6), as this is the largest revenue 
percentage of a single business – Heavy construction (SIC code: 1629). 
 
After summing up the revenue percentages of business sectors with the same 2-digit 
SIC code, I obtain the detailed information in Table 6-7. From the table I find the 
Related Ratio as the largest revenue proportion of a business at the 2-digit SIC code 
level. It is 0.8382 from the business of Heavy Construction, Ex. Building (SIC code: 
16). 
 
Following the approach discussed above, I calculate the firm’s Vertical Ratio. 
According to the standard described above, the company does not have any 
businesses in the manufacturing sector, so I judge its vertical ratio to be zero. The 
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sum of this firm’s different ratios is listed in Table 6-5. And according to the rules 
shown in Figure 6-2, this firm is classified into the category of Dominant-Unrelated. 
 
6.4.3 Example Three: XinJiang TianYe Stock CO., Ltd 
The third example is constructed using a firm listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
XinJiang TianYe Stock Co., Ltd is company that has businesses in agriculture, 
construction and manufacturing. Its revenue breakdown in 1999 is detailed in Table 
6-8. 
 
First, following the methodology described earlier, I quote the largest revenue 
percentage of a single business as the Specialization Ratio of the company. That is 
0.4757 from the business of agricultural chemicals (SIC code: 2879). 
 
As to the Related Ratio, details of revenue breakdowns at the level of 2-digit SIC 
code are listed in Table 6-9. Clearly, I find that the Related Ratio from the largest 
revenue percentage as 0.5266, from the business of chemicals and allied products 
(SIC Code: 28). 
 
Still using the same method, I come to the calculation of Vertical Ratio. As with the 
second example, I find no vertical related chain in all of this firm’s business sectors. 
The Vertical Ratio is consequently zero, which is the same as in the second example. 
All the ratios for the three examples are provided in Table 6-5. According to the rules 
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shown in Figure 6-2, XinJiang TianYe Co., Ltd is classified into the category of 
conglomerate. 
 
6.5 China and U.S. Firms: What’s the Difference? 
 
I now describe the results of my classification procedure. I do this with reference to 
three examples I quoted in section 6.4: Shan Dong Dong-E E-Jiao CO., Ltd, 
Gezhouba CO., Ltd and Xin Jiang Tian Ye CO., Ltd. Following the method I 
described above, I classify all the China’s listed companies into different 
diversification categories and try to find out the strategy evolution of these listed 
firms. 
 
6.5.1 Transition towards diversification of China’s listed companies 
I calculated the three diversification ratios for all of China’s listed companies from 
1991 to 2002 and report the results in table 6-11. However, I have limited information 
for China’s listed companies from 1991 to 1994, thus I will analyze the 
diversification trend of China’s listed companies from 1995 afterwards. From 1995 to 
2002, the number of listed companies on both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges increased from 300 to 1,186. I classified all the firms listed in each year in 
this period into different categories according to Rumelt’s rule. By looking at the 
trends over time for this classification procedure, I identified several interesting 
patterns in these companies’ diversification transition paths. The numbers and 
percentages of different categorized firms are shown in Table 6-10 and Table 6-11. 
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To analyze the trend of China’s listed companies toward diversification, I follow 
Rumelt to pick up three years (1995, 1998 and 2002) to further estimate those 
companies’ pattern of change. The reason I select these three years is that I want to 
study the changing pattern of China’s listed companies in three year blocks and 
compare it to what has happened to U.S. firms.  
 
For this analysis, I first classify the strategic categories into four major classes: Single 
Business, Dominant Business (including Dominant Vertical, Dominant Unrelated and 
Dominant Linked), Related Business (Related Linked) and Unrelated Business 
(Conglomerates). The observed percentage of firms in each strategic category is listed 
in Table 6-12. The same information is portrayed graphically in Figure 6-3 and Figure 
6-4. Both reveal a dramatic pattern of change. Between 1995 and 2002 the percentage 
of diversified corporations more than tripled; the percentage of firms following 
Related or Unrelated Business strategies of expansion rose from about 14 percent to 
about 71 percent in the twelve-year period. Clearly, there has been a basic change in 
the product-market scope of the listed companies in China in this period.  
 
The most striking change in any individual group is the decline in the number of 
Single Business firms among all the China’s listed companies. Comprising more than 
eighty percent of all the companies in 1995, those Single Business firms drop to less 
than thirty percent of the total. Equally noteworthy was the increase in listed 
companies that followed Unrelated Business strategies. In 1995 this group accounted 
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for only 14 percent of the total, but by 2002 more than two out of every three firms 
fell into the Unrelated Business category. Another important trend is the increase in 
the category of Dominant Business. The percentage of firms in this category has 
grown from zero in 1995 to about 34 percent in 2002. The behavior of sub-classes of 
the Dominant category shed some light on how this happened. Dominant Linked 
almost remained to be zero, contributing nothing to the increase. Most of the increase 
comes from the percentage increase in Dominant Unrelated, from 0 percent to around 
30 percent. The importance of the Related Business category is just like that of 
Dominant Linked, always just above zero.  
 
The basic pattern of change in the composition of China’s listed companies between 
1995 and 2002 was the increase in the Dominant and Unrelated Business categories at 
the expense of the Single Business category. But how did this and other 
redistributions come about? Did most of the Single Business firms of 1995 adopt 
strategies of diversification by 2002, or was the increase in Unrelated Business 
category caused by the entrance of newly listed companies?  
 
To separate the effect of strategic change from that of newly listed companies’ effects, 
I looked at those firms that were initially listed in 1995 and were kept listed through 
1998 until 2002. Three hundred companies satisfied this condition, and the 
distributions by category for these firms are shown in Table 6-13. Clearly, there was a 
significant strategic change among these firms: 58 percent of these firms moved from 
one category to another between 1995 and 2002, and most of these moves were in the 
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direction of increased diversification. The changes made by the firms that were listed 
in 1995 resulted in strategic class populations very much like those of all the China’s 
listed companies.  
 
To make this point in more detail, I tracked all the listed A shares (listed in RMB) 
that had their IPOs in the years 1995, 1996, and 1997. I recorded the diversification 
category distribution of these firms in their IPO year and then again five years after 
they were first listed. For example, for the firms that were initially listed in 1995, I 
compare their diversification category between in 1995 and in 2000. The comparison 
is listed in table 6-14. From the table, I find a clear strategic change of China’s listed 
firms who had an IPO sometime in the 1995 to 1997 period. For these firms, the 
percentage of Single Business firms has decreased more or less during a five  year 
period. The largest decrease is for firms initially listed in 1997 (45.93% from 1997 to 
2002). In the meanwhile, the percentage of Conglomerate firms has increased to a 
certain extent. Another trend is the increase of Dominant Unrelated firms. During 
every five-year period, the group of Dominant Unrelated firms is expanding. This 
expansion reaches a peak in the 1996 to 2001 period (an increase of 22.77 percent). 
This shows a trend that firms are moving from the category of Single Business to the 
categories of Conglomerates and Dominant Unrelated. 
 
Table 6-12 also shows the possibility that there exists a high degree of stability in 
each five year period in the pattern of transitions among the diversification categories. 
Using the transition rate for 1995-1998, I projected the category distribution in 2002 
CHAPTER 6                     RUMELT’S CLASSIFICATION OF DIVERSIFICATION 
 113 
and compare the projected percentage with that of the actual one in Table 6-15. The 
projected percentages comprise the supposed distribution if from 1998 to 2002 the 
number of firms in each category increased or decreased at the same rate as that of 
those in 1995 to 1998. Compared to the figure is the actual distribution across all the 
categories I observed in 2002. 
 
The results of this procedure are interesting. Except for Dominant Unrelated, 
Dominant Linked and Related Linked, the other categories’ percentages are either 
magnified or lessened. The vital reason behind this is that China’s listed firms have 
been moving toward a diversification strategy at a much faster pace during 1998-2002 
period than during 1995-1998 period. Hence, I find a declining percentage of Single 
Businesses and a rising rate of Conglomerate formation in the latter time period.  
 
6.5.2 Comparison between China and U.S. firms 
Rumelt did his classification study on the basis of randomly selected firms out of a 
group of companies. The group was taken to be the 500 largest United States 
industrial companies, as listed annually by Fortune magazine. The 1969 sample was 
constructed by taking the 100 firms that Wrigley had selected randomly from the 
1967 Fortune 500, deleting those which were no longer among the largest 500 in 
1969 and randomly selecting firms from the 1969 group to take their places.  
 
Rumelt estimated the percentages of 500 largest industrial corporations that fell 
within the four major and six minor categories of diversification strategy, shown in 
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Table 6-16. I compare Rumelt’s results with those for China’s listed companies and 
find that several trends are immediately apparent. 
 
The biggest similarity between China’s companies and U.S. firms is that they both 
show a transition toward diversification. The most striking trend in U.S. firms’ 
strategic category evolution is the decline of Single Business (from 35 percent in 
1949 to 6 percent in 1969) and the increase of Unrelated Business (from 3 percent in 
1949 to 20 percent in 1969). This trend in isolation is similar to that of China’s listed 
companies. However, when looking at the trends in the Dominant Business and 
Related Business categories, I have found distinct differences between the two. As to 
the Dominant Business category, China’s listed companies have shown an 
extraordinary growth rate (from 3.33 percent in 1995 to 34.38 percent in 2002). 
However, for the U.S. firms, the relative importance of the Dominant Business 
category, as a whole, decreased slightly during the twenty-year period of Rumelt’s 
study. It appeared to have grown between 1949 and 1959, but then it diminished by 
more than this amount in the second decade.  
 
By looking at what had happened in the sub-class of the Dominant category, I find 
that the Dominant Vertical group was extremely stable, and the Dominant Linked 
group, on the other hand, became much smaller between 1959 and 1969 (dropping 
from 20 percent to 12 percent), which is the chief reason for the overall drop in the 
size of Dominant Business category. But as for China’s listed companies, I find that 
all the increases are in the sub-class of the Dominant Unrelated category.  
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Another major difference between the U.S. and China samples is found in the 
category of Related Business. In contrast to U.S. firms, exceptionally small amounts 
of firms seem to fall into this category out of China’s listed companies. In U.S. firms, 
the Related Business category became increasingly important between 1949 and 1969, 
almost doubling in size. All the increase in the Related category was in the Related 
Linked subclass, which tripled in size between 1949 and 1969, increasing from 7.9 
percent to 23.6 percent.  
 
Rumelt projected the 1969 percentages using the 1949-1959 transition rates.  
Rumelt’s result of the projected and actual percentages is listed in Table 6-17. It 
shows a surprising degree of stability between decades in the pattern of transitions 
among the minor categories. The difference between these two distributions is purely 
due to the difference between the 1949-1959 and 1959-1969 patterns of strategic 
change. Except for the category of Dominant Unrelated, all the projected percentages 
are fairly close to the actual observed rate. This is even more striking if I compare 
these results to what I obtained from a similar analysis on China’s listed companies. 
 
The data of China’s listed companies and U.S. firms indicate that management in a 
considerable number of firms saw the opportunity or felt the need to diversify. 
However, when coming to the issue of how firms diversify, China’s firms and U.S. 
firms give me two different faces. As to the U.S. firms from 1949 to 1969, it is 
obvious that most of the firms that moved from Single Business to Related or 
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Unrelated Business strategies passed through the Dominant category at some point 
(Table 6-16). It is worth noting how these firms behave after they move from Single 
Business into Dominant Business. During the two decades (1949-1969), it does 
appear that firms that went from the Single to the Dominant categories in the first 
decade were no more likely, and perhaps even less likely, to move on to the Related 
category in the next decade than firms that were Dominant in both 1949 and 1959. As 
the managers of many Dominant Business companies seem either unwilling or unable 
to undertake further diversification, this category cannot be simply viewed as 
consisting of companies that are on their way to full diversification. In fact, most of 
the Single Business diversifiers during both decades entered only businesses that 
were closely related to ongoing activities.  
 
As to China’s listed companies, the analysis in this chapter shows that they rapidly 
and directly evolve towards full diversification. For those firms who moved away 
from a Single Business, half of the firms went to the category of Dominant Business 
and the other half went directly to the category of Unrelated Business, without a stop 
at the mid-point of the Dominant or Related Business categories. Even those who  
move into the Dominant category mostly choose the Dominant Unrelated category.  
 
It is also worth noting that while many China companies choose to diversify; another 
group of firms choose to remain in a single business. These single business firms 
came to form the biggest group of all the different categories. It is striking when this 
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figure is compared with the percentage that U.S. single business firms have occupied: 
28.41 percent in China and 6.2 percent in U.S. (Table 6-12 and Table 6-16).  
 
It seems that China companies either do not diversify or diversify into many un-
related business sectors, while U.S. firms are more inclined to diversify into related 
industries as a first step toward full diversification. The diversification pace of 
China’s listed companies also shows a different pattern. Managers of these companies 
seem more active and prone to diversify into unrelated business activities compared 




In this chapter I described the classification scheme initiated by Rumelt in 1974. I 
used this classification scheme to examine the diversification status of China’s listed 
companies from 1995 to 2002.  I began this chapter by detailing Rumelt’s 
classification scheme of diversification measures and diversification categories. The 
procedure used in classifying firms mixed quantitative measures and qualitative 
assessments. As Rumelt (1974) pointed out, “the most crucial of the classification 
procedure was the decision as to what constitutes a firm’s largest discrete business 
and the evaluation of the nature of the interrelationships among a firm’s businesses”. 
 
Then I present and analyze the census data on the composition of China’s listed 
companies from 1995 to 2002. Following Rumelt’s methodology, I calculated the 
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diversification measures of all the listed companies and each company into a 
diversification category. To clarify the details of the procedure I provided three 
examples. I then selected three years (1995, 1998 and 2002) to explore the changing 
pattern of firms’ diversification strategy. I observed a clear trend for China’s listed 
companies to move toward full diversification.  
 
To separate the effect of strategic change from that of newly listed companies, I look 
at those firms that were initially listed in 1995 and compare the distribution of 
diversification categories of these firms in 1995, 1998 and 2002. Additionally, I 
tracked after all the listed A share companies (listed in RMB) that have their IPO 
during 1995-1997 and compare the distribution of diversification category five years 
after IPO to the distribution of IPO year. Both studies find that the group of Single 
Business firms is shrinking while the categories of Dominant Unrelated and 
Conglomerate are gaining their percentage share.  
 
Then I compared the diversification trend of China’s listed companies with that of 
U.S. firms. I found that the firms in the two contexts show very different 
diversification evolution patters. China’s companies either do not diversify or the 
companies diversify into many un-related business sectors. Meanwhile, U.S. firms are 
more inclined to diversify into related industries as a first step toward full 
diversification. Managers of China’s companies are more active and prone to 
diversify into unrelated business activities compared to their U.S. peers. 
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Based on these analyses, I see the following questions as being among the most 
interesting to examine in the product diversification developments of China’s 
companies: 
(1) The evolutionary trend of China’s listed firms’ diversification strategy— it is 
interesting to explore how China’s listed firms evolve and transform from one 
diversification category to another, according to Rumelt’s classification;  
(2) The reasons behind the evolutionary trend— what are the motives for these 
firms to diversify and why do they diversify in such a pattern as observed? 
Can I identify the factors that influence a firm’s strategy of diversification, 
such as institutional change, ownership structure, and so forth? 
(3) The implication of these trends for firm performance— what effect will a 
firm’s diversification strategy have on firm’s performance? Will a particular 
diversification strategy enhance firm’s value or not? 
(4) Does context matter— compared to developed countries, China is under a 
transition stage and its firms may behave differently from those in U.S. or 
Japan. Using Rumelt’s classification which was built based on U.S. firms, I 
have found a different diversification trend of China’s firms, which might 
have different implications for these firms’ performance. 
(5) The future of China’s listed firms— will these firms next evolve in a similar 
pattern as U.S. firms? Will they continue with the observed trend to diversify 
more or follow the pattern of companies in developed countries to focus more? 
I will examine points two, three and four in the remaining chapters in this thesis. 
 





In this chapter I describe the empirical results for my hypotheses tests. In chapter five, 
I described the models that would be used to test each hypothesis, from hypothesis 
one to hypothesis seven. In this section I describe the results in the sequence of the 
hypotheses and analyze the relationships between empirical results and the 
hypotheses, one-by-one. I use two major estimation algorithms: General Least Square 
regression and ANOVA to compare the means. 
 
7.1 Summary of Key Results 
 
To test the different hypotheses, I have used different econometric models. As I have 
discussed in chapter four, hypothesis one through three predict the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm diversification. Hypotheses four through six 
explore the relationship between diversification and firm performance, as contingent 
on a firm’s ownership structure. Hypothesis seven compares the different diversified 
firm’s performance using Rumelt’s scheme.  
 
Table 7-1 summarizes the results for the hypotheses tests. Overall, I find strong 
empirical support for two of the nine hypotheses (H1 and H2) and partial support for 
three other hypotheses (H4 H7a and H7b). Four of the hypotheses are not supported 
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(H3, H5, H6a and H6b). I will discuss the details of the empirical results for each 
hypothesis in the next section. 
 
7.2 Hypotheses Tests Results 
 
I have multiple measures of ownership concentration such as the shareholding of the 
largest shareholder, the shareholding of the five largest shareholders, the shareholding 
of the ten largest shareholders and the herfindahl of five largest shareholders. As to a 
firm’s diversification level, I have multiple measures such as the herfindahl measure 
calculated at two, three and four digit SIC code levels, the entropy measure calculated 
at two, three and four digit SIC code levels and the concentric ratio. In addition I 
measure firm’s performance by ROA and Tobin’s Q.  
 
In the empirical tests, I ran regression for each possible combination of these 
measures, varying at different measures of firm ownership concentration, 
diversification level or firm performance. Across these numerous models, I did not 
obtain qualitatively different results from what I report below. Part of the reason for 
this rests in the data reported in Table 5-6: the correlation between some of the 
measures, such as TOP5 and TOP10 (0.999), TOP1 and TOP10 (0.948), is very high. 
As the results are similar, I will concentrate on reporting those for specifications in 
which diversification is defined by 4-digit herfindahl (HERF_4), ownership 
concentration is defined by the summary of the largest five shareholders’ 
shareholdings (TOP5) and performance is measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q.   
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7.2.1 Hypothesis One 
In the first hypothesis, I predict a negative relationship between a firm’s ownership 
concentration and its diversification level. Table 7-2 reports the results of both 
random and fixed effect GLS econometric models in the test of this hypothesis. I use 
the 4-digit herfindahl measure as the dependent variable to measure a firm’s 
diversification level. As to firm’s ownership concentration, I use the measure defined 
as the shareholdings of the five largest shareholders (TOP5). In subsequent 
hypothesis tests, I will report results in the same pattern as I do for hypothesis 1.  
 
In Table 7-2, I find that the relationship between ownership concentration and 
diversification is consistent with what was predicted in hypothesis 1. Firm ownership 
concentration is negatively correlated with a firm’s diversification level in both 
random and fixed effect model. It is worth noting that in all the other models that are 
not shown in Table 7-2, where I use TOP1, TOP10 and HERF_5 as independent 
variables respectively, I obtained a similar negative and significant relationship. In 
addition, I repeated the test using two and three digit herfindahl as dependent 
variables. The results remained the same. When I use two, three and four digit 
entropy as the dependent variable, the results are very similar to what I have found 
using herfindahl as the dependent variable. I will discuss this result in detail in the 
next chapter.  For now, I can conclude that Hypothesis 1 is fully supported. 
 
7.2.2 Hypothesis Two 
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In chapter four I outlined hypothesis 2 which predicted a negative relationship 
between state ownership and firm’s diversification level. Table 7-3 records the 
empirical results of the econometric model that is designed to test hypothesis two. In 
Table 7-3, I display the results for random and fixed effect models.  
 
As shown in Table 7-3, the results accorded with the predictions of hypothesis 2. In 
the situation where I did not include the square term of state shareholding, I obtained 
a negative coefficient in both random and fixed effect models (Table 7-3). This 
indicates that the level of state shareholding is negatively related to firm’s 
diversification level. I will discuss this finding in more detail in chapter 8.  
 
When I added the square term into the equation, I obtained non-significant 
coefficients. I obtained the similar result when using entropy as the diversification 
measure, which is not shown in the tables. Overall, the state ownership is negatively 
correlated with a firm’s diversification, and this relationship appears to be linear, not 
curvi- linear. Thus, hypothesis 2 is fully supported.  
 
7.2.3 Hypothesis Three 
In chapter four, for hypothesis 3, I predicted a U-shape relationship between legal 
person shareholding and firm diversification. I contended that legal person 
shareholding will be first negatively and then positively correlated with firm 
diversification. I follow a similar method as for hypothesis 2, to test this hypothesis. 
As reported in Table 7-4, I find that legal person shareholding is positively related to 
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firm diversification in random effect model (Table 7-4). But I did not find a 
significant coefficient for the fixed effect model.  
 
Next, I added a quadratic term into the equation. I did not find an expected non-
monotonic relationship between legal person shareholding and firm diversification. 
Instead, I found a significantly positive coefficient for the square term of legal person 
in fixed effect model.  
 
For the non-linear model, I wanted to check if the addition of the new variable (the 
quadratic term) added additional explanatory power to the model. I did the F-test 
between the linear and non- linear models to test whether the difference of R-square 
between linear and non- linear models are significant. For the random effect models, 
the R-square excluding the square term of LEGAL is 0.878 while the R-square 
including the square term of LEGAL is 0.882. Therefore the F-statistic is 0.5 
(insignificant at 0.01 level). Following the same calculations, the F-statistic for the 
difference between the fixed effect linear and non- linear models is 0.8 (insignificant 
at 0.01 level). Therefore, the R-square does not increase significantly. This result 
shows that the addition of the quadratic term does not improve the fit of the model 
with the data, which means that any sign and significance changes in the coefficient 
estimates are trivial and there is no value in adding the square terms.  Therefore, the 
best and correct model is the linear model. 
 
For the linear model in the random effect, I find a positive  
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relationship between legal person and firm diversification (Figure 7-1). 
Thus, hypothesis 3 is not supported.  
 
7.2.4 Hypothesis Four 
In chapter four, for hypothesis 4, I predicted an inverted U-shape relationship 
between a firm’s diversification level and its performance. I contended that a firm’s 
diversification will first be positively and then be negatively correlated with a firm’s 
performance. Table 7-5 and Table 7-6 present the results for the 1991-2002 sample of 
these tests of hypothesis four. I used two different measures of firm’s performance: 
ROA (Return on assets) and Tobin’s Q to report the results.  
 
To account for the possibility of non-monotonic relationship, I included both linear 
and quadratic terms of diversification measures. From Table 7-5 I find that there is a 
significant and positive linear relationship between firm diversification and firm 
performance, when firm performance is measured by Q. However, I did not find any 
quadratic relationship between the two variables. In Table 7-6, when I measure firm’s 
performance using ROA, the results are similar to those in Table 7-5: I find a 
significant positive relationship between firm diversification and firm performance, 
but no quadratic relationship.  
 
Overall, I did not find a quadratic relationship between diversification and firm 
performance as expected in hypothesis 4. Rather, I found that diversification has a 
positive relationship with firm performance when I use either market based or 
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financial performance measures. Thus hypothesis four is partially supported. I will 
discuss this finding in detail in the next chapter in my thesis. 
 
7.2.5 Hypothesis Five 
In the chapter 4, for hypothesis 5, I contended that firm’s ownership concentration 
would make the inverted-U shape relationship between firm diversification and firm 
performance steeper. To test this hypothesis, I use an interaction term created as the 
product of the diversification measure and concentration measure to see whether there 
exists any concentration effect on the relationship between diversification and firm 
performance. I introduced two cross product terms: the product of the five largest 
shareholdings and diversification (TOP5*HERF_4), and the product of the five 
largest shareholdings and the square term of firm diversification (TOP5*HERF_42).  
 
Table 7-7 and Table 7-8 present the results for the two models. The two models show 
results for the two different firm performance measures: Tobin’s Q and ROA, for the 
1991-2002 period. When Tobin’s Q is used as the measure of firm performance, first 
of all I found a negative correlation between ownership concentration and firm 
performance, which indicates that the more concentrated a firm’s ownership, the 
worse its market performance.  
 
Next, for the equations that exc lude the square term of firm diversification (column 2 
and column 3 in Table 7-7), I did not find any significant signs for the interaction 
term of ownership concentration and firm diversification. However, I found a 
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significant and positive correlation between firm diversification and firm performance 
(Tobin’s Q) for both random and fixed effect models.  
 
When I added the square term into the equations, for both the random and fixed effect 
models, I again did not find any significant curvilinear relationship between the 
interaction term of firm diversification and firm performance (column 4 and column 
5). Thus, hypothesis 5 is not supported when I use Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm 
performance.  
 
When I use ROA as the measure of firm performance, I found a positive linear 
correlation between diversification and firm performance, but did not find any 
curvilinear relationship (Table 7-8). Secondly, I did not find any significant sign for 
the interaction term of ownership concentration and firm diversification. Therefore, 
hypothesis 5 is not supported. 
 
7.2.6 Hypothesis Six 
In chapter four I have made two predictions about hypothesis six. First, I contended 
that State shareholding would make firm diversification have a greater negative 
impact on firm performance as diversification increases. In contrast to this effect, I 
predicted that Legal Person shareholding would make firm diversification have a 
greater positive impact on firm performance as diversification increases. 
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The results of these tests are presented in Table 7-9 to Table 7-12. For the effect of 
state shareholding, I use Tobin’s Q as the performance measure in Table 7-9 and 
ROA in Table 7-10. In Table 7-9, as to the interaction term of state shareholding and 
diversification, I did not find any significant sign to the coefficients. In addition, I 
also did not find the interaction term of state ownership and the square term of 
diversification to be significant. 
  
When I use ROA as the performance measure, I find a significant and positive linear 
relationship between firm diversification and financial performance (Table 7-10, 
column 2 and column 3). However, the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms 
are not significant. This result shows that state ownership does not show its influence 
as much on the relationship between firm diversification and accounting performance. 
Thus, hypothesis 6a is not supported when firm performance is measured by Tobin’s 
Q or ROA.  
 
As to the role of legal person shareholding on firm diversification and firm 
performance, I present the empirical results in Table 7-11 and Table 7-12. When I 
measure firm performance using Tobin’s Q (Table 7-11), I find an inverted U-shape 
relationship between firm diversification and firm performance (column 5 and 
column 6) in both random and fixed effects model. From the table I find that firm 
diversification first exerts a positive and then a negative impact on firm performance 
as it keeps increasing.  
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In addition, I found legal person shareholding to moderate these relationships. In both 
fixed and random effects model (column 5 and column 6), firm diversification is 
firstly positively correlated with firm performance, and legal person lessens this 
positive effect (the significantly negative effect of the interaction term of legal person 
and diversification). As shown in Figure 7-2, as a firm’s diversification increases, 
high levels of diversification are negatively linked to firm performance. At the same 
time, the greater the legal person ownership, the weaker the negative effect (as 
indicated by the significant positive sign of the interaction term of legal person and 
the square term of diversification).  
 
Thus, I find that legal person did not enhance the positive correlation between firm 
diversification and firm performance. Rather, lega l person shareholding moderates 
the impact of firm diversification on firm performance, which means that it lessens 
the negative effect and reduces the positive effect between firm diversification and 
firm performance.  
 
Although I obtained these findings for the Tobin’s Q model, when I use ROA as the 
performance measure (Table 7-12), I did not find the interaction term to be significant, 
nor did I find any quadratic relationship between legal person shareholding and firm 
performance. Thus, I did not obtain support for hypothesis 6b.   
 
7.2.7 Hypothesis Seven 
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In chapter four, I made two predictions in hypothesis 7 in which I switched the focus 
of the measure of firm diversification from a continuous herfindahl or entropy 
measure to the Rumelt categorizations.  
 
In hypothesis seven, I contended that for the listed firms controlled by state 
shareholdings, Single Business firms would show the best performance while 
Unrelated Business firms would show the worst performance. I regard those firms 
whose largest shareholding is state ownership as being controlled by the government. 
I present the empirical results for this hypothesis test in Table 7-13.  
 
In the results shown in Table 7-13, I documented the empirical results for the 1991-
2002 periods. For the firms controlled by the state shareholding, I find that the 
category that shows the highest ROA is Single Business, with the highest average 
ROA as 0.0409 (Table 7-13). Additionally, the category that shows the worst firm 
performance in ROA is Dominant Vertical, with the average ROA as 0.0142. As can 
be seen in the table, the significant differences are found between Single Business and 
Dominant Unrelated and between Single Business and Conglomerate.  
 
If I measure firm performance with Tobin’s Q, the results are almost the same. The 
category with the highest Q are Conglomerates and Single Business (2.5667 and 
2.5266 in Table 7-13 separately) and the lowest is Dominant Unrelated (2.2042 in 
Table 7-13). In addition, I find that the mean Q of Dominant Unrelated is 
significantly different from both the mean Q of Single Business and the mean Q of 
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Conglomerate at 0.1 significance level. Thus, I find that both Single Business firms 
and Conglomerates show better performance than Dominant Unrelated companies. 
This finding shows a U-shape relationship between firm diversification and firm 
performance. Therefore, I conclude to have found partial support for hypothesis 7a. 
 
As to the firms controlled by legal person shareholding, I predicted that Related firms 
would show the best performance while Single Business firms would show the worst 
performance. I document the empirical results in Table 7-13. Again this time, I find 
the category of Single Business to show the best performance in ROA (0.0424 in 
Table 7-13), followed by Conglomerates (0.0338 in Table 7-13). In addition, 
Dominant Unrelated firms show the very low firm performance (0.0194). Statistically, 
I found that the mean of ROA for Dominant Unrelated is significantly lower than that 
of Single Business (Table 7-13). 
 
When I measure firm performance using Tobin’s Q, the results are a bit different. I 
find Conglomerate firms show the best performance (2.9973 in Table 7-13) and 
Dominant Unrelated firms show the worst performance (2.8065 in Table 7-13). In 
addition, the difference between these two categories is significant at the 0.1 
significance level. Therefore, by combining the results for ROA and Q, I can 
conclude that Dominant Unrelated firms show the worst performance while Single 
Business firms and Conglomerates show the best performance. Thus, I find partial 
support for hypothesis 7b. 
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7.2.8 Control Variables 
As the logarithm of firm assets and logarithm of firm sales are highly correlated 
(0.780 at Table 5-6), I used them separately as proxies for firm size in the empirical 
tests. As I obtained similar results when I use each of them, I only reported the 
coefficients of LOGSALES (the logarithm of sales) in the tables. Throughout the 
empirical tests, I find that LOGSALE is positively related to firm diversification. In 
addition, LOGSALE is negatively related to Tobin’s Q. This finding is not consistent 
with Fama and French (1995)’s finding that firm size is positively related to market 
performance. In addition, I find that LOGSALE is positively related to ROA, which 
shows that a larger size of a firm is associated with its financial performance.  
 
It is worth noting that in the models the liquidity and IPO age generally have a 
consistently significant influence on firm performance. As the ratio of debt to equity 
is too large to show the proper coefficients, I divide the ratio by 1000. The ratio of 
debt to equity is found to be negatively correlated with ROA but not with Tobin’s Q, 
which shows that the higher ratio of debt, the worse financial performance. IPO age is 
negatively related to ROA and Tobin’s Q, showing that the longer listed firms have 
worse performance than firms with a shorter history of being listed in general. The 
industry, year and province dummies all show their significance in the regression. As 
it is not the central topic of my thesis and the space for the tables is limited, I did not 
report the coefficient and p-value of provinces and industries.  
 
7.3 Summary 
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In this chapter I discussed the empirical results of the econometric models devised to 
test every hypothesis that are proposed in chapter four. Overall, I find strong 
empirical support for two of the nine hypotheses (H1 and H2) and partial support for 
three other hypotheses (H4 H7a and H7b). Four of the hypotheses are not supported 
(H3, H5, H6a and H6b). I summarize all the empirical results according to each 
hypothesis in Table 7-1.  
 
In all, I find that ownership concentration is negatively correlated with firm 
diversification, which means that the more concentrated a firm’s ownership is, the 
lower the level of its diversification. I find state shareholding to be negatively related 
to firm diversification, while legal person shareholding exerts a positive  impact on 
firm diversification. In addition, I find a positive and linear relationship between firm 
diversification and firm performance, but no curvilinear relationships (when firm 
performance is measured by ROA). Additionally, I did not find any curvilinear 
relationship between firm diversification and firm performance on the contingency of 
ownership concentration as well as state ownership. However, it turns out to involve a 
complicated inverted U-shape when I take the contingency effect legal person 
shareholding into consideration (Figure 7-2).  
 
My hypotheses concerning the relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm diversification, and the relationship between state ownership and firm 
diversification received full support. However, the contingent relationship between 
CHAPTER 7                                                                                            RESULTS 
 134 
ownership concentration, ownership identity and firm performance are not consistent 
with my predictions in the hypotheses. I will discuss the meanings and implications of 
these findings in the next chapter, in which I draw my conclusions for this study. 
 





My thesis has examined the diversification and performance patterns of China’s listed 
companies. To do this, I incorporated research on corporate governance, 
diversification strategy and ownership structure in this study which is situated in the 
environment of a transition economy: China.  
 
In this study, I first investigate the incentives for China’s listed companies to 
diversify and the impact of diversification on firms’ performance. Second, I explore 
the relationship between ownership structure (ownership concentration and ownership 
identity) and firm diversification. Third, I link ownership structure, firm 
diversification and firm performance together and study the contingent effect of 
ownership structure on the relationship between firm diversification and firm 
performance. Finally, I develop an analysis of China’s listed firms’ diversification 
strategies that is consistent with Rumelt’s diversification classification. I compare the 
diversification trend of China’s listed companies to those of the United States and 
find a different behavior pattern and performance implications for China’s firms.  
 
My study has four major areas of findings. The first area is about the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm diversification. I find that ownership 
concentration is negatively related to firm diversification. In addition, I find that state 
shareholding is also negatively related to firm diversification. Second, I find a 
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positive relationship between China’s firms’ diversification and performance, which 
is against the conventional wisdom as derived from the examination of firms in 
Western countries, such as the U.S. and U.K. (Servaes, 1996). The third area of my 
findings is about the contingent effect of ownership structure on the relationship 
between firm diversification and firm performance. I find that China’s listed firms’ 
ownership concentration has a positive impact on the relationship between firm 
diversification and firm performance when firm performance is measured by ROA 
(Table 7-8). Additionally, I find that legal person sharing moderates the relationship 
between firm diversification and firm performance (Figure 7-2). This finding is 
important as it reveals the roles that legal person shareholding plays in influencing 
firm strategy and thus performance. Here the moderating effect means that Legal 
Person Shareholding makes the slope of the inverted U-shape curve between firm 
diversification and firm performance more flat. Finally, I did not find significant 
performance differences between firms in all the various diversification categories 
based on Rumelt’s scheme. I did, however, find that Single Business and 
Conglomerate firms to show better performance than Dominant Unrelated firms, 
which suggests a U-shape curve for the relationship between firm diversification and 
firm performance. In addition, I find a general trend towards a higher level of firm 
diversification for all of China’s listed companies in the decade after the two stock 
markets were established. 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the above findings in more detail and raise the 
implications of this study and further research directions. 
CHAPTER 8                                                                                        CONCLUSION 
 137 
 
8.1 Ownership Concentration 
 
8.1.1 Ownership Concentration and Firm Diversification 
In this study, I find that for China’s listed companies, ownership concentration is 
negatively correlated with firm diversification, which means that the more 
concentrated a firm’s ownership structure, the lower level of its diversification. This 
finding is consistent with Hoskisson and Turk’s (1990) finding that firms with 
distributed ownership are susceptible to be associated with excessive diversification. 
In China, this situation seems to hold that the block holders are more efficient in 
dealing with the free-rider problem that is associated with the lack of monitor on firm 
management and thus the prevalence of overly high diversification levels. For this 
issue, I find a consistency and similarity between China’s firms and those of Western 
countries. 
 
8.1.2 Ownership Concentration on Firm Diversification and Performance 
I did not find the ownership concentration to enhance the slope of the inverted U-
shape curve between firm diversification and firm performance as I predicted in 
Hypothesis 5. However, I find that ownership concentration has a positive impact on 
the relationship between firm diversification and firm performance when firm 
performance is measured by ROA (Table 7-8: random and fixed effect). This finding 
means that as a firms’ ownership concentration keeps increasing, the marginal benefit 
of diversification will increase accordingly. This finding is consistent with the  
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conventional wisdom that the management has a higher potential to expropriate when 
ownership concentration is distributed (Morck et al., 1988). In addition, this finding 
may partly support the argument of a steeper inverted U-shape curve in the left half 
where firm diversification is positively related to firm performance. I see the potential 
here to explore the role of firm ownership concentration on the interactive 
relationship between firm diversification and firm performance in future work. 
 
8.2 State Ownership 
 
8.2.1 State Ownership and Firm Diversification 
I find that state shareholding is negatively correlated with firm diversification, which 
is consistent with my prediction in the hypothesis. According to the literature and 
conventional wisdom, state ownership is demonstrated to be ineffective in monitoring 
a firm’s management in China (Xu & Wang, 1997). The finding in my study suggests 
that state shareholding has complex impact on a firm’s diversification and 
performance as well. Directly, state shareholding is negatively related to firm 
diversification (Table 5-6). In addition, state shareholding has its most weighted 
control in the largest SOEs of China such as China Telecom, China National 
Petroleum Corporation and Sinopec Corporation. All these large SOEs are not 
diversified according to my diversification calculation standard and operate as a 
monopolist or oligopolist in their major businesses. This fact might explain part of the 
reason behind the negative relationship of state shareholding and firm diversification. 
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8.3 Legal Person 
 
8.3.1 Legal Person Shareholding and Firm Diversification 
In the empirical part I find that legal person shareholding has a positive impact on 
firm diversification, which means that a firm’s diversification level increases as the 
shareholding of legal person in the firm increases. This finding is important in that it 
reveals an influence that Legal Person shareholding is exerting on firm performance. 
In summary, my empirical findings suggest that legal person shareholding of China’s 
listed companies have played a complicated role in influencing firm performance. On 
the one hand, as the literature has already shown, legal person shareholders exert a 
monitoring effect and successfully lead the firm towards better performance when 
they hold significant stake in the firms (Xu & Wang, 1997). On the other hand, 
however, the controlling power of legal person shareholding also leads the firm to 
excess diversification that deteriorates firm’s profitability (Table 7-4). These results 
are consistent with the idea that legal person shareholders can perform an effective 
monitoring role when it has substantial power in a firm’s decision making, as given 
by high levels of equity ownership.  
 
8.3.2 Legal Person on Firm Diversification and Firm Performance 
As to the contingent effect of legal person on the correlation between firm 
diversification and firm performance, I find that legal person shareholding has a 
moderating role on the above relationship. It means that legal person shareholding 
would lessen the positive impact, and reduce the negative impact of firm 
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diversification on firm performance. In other words, when I find a positive 
relationship between firm diversification and firm performance, legal person would 
lessen this positive relationship when I consider its effect on firm’s diversification 
and combine legal person with firm diversification and firm performance. Similarly, 
when I find a negative relationship between firm diversification and firm performance, 
legal person shareholding would reduce this negative effect when I consider its 
impact on firm diversification and add this effect into the relationship between firm 
diversification and firm performance. 
 
In fact, compared to the already extensive research on state shareholding of China’s 
listed companies (Xu and Wang, 1997; Hovey et al., 2003), the research on legal 
person shareholding has received limited attentions. My empirical findings show that 
on the one hand, legal person shareholding shows its positive effect when it controls 
the deteriorating impact of firm diversification on firm performance. On the other 
hand, the controlling power of legal person shareholding also leads the shareholder to 
expropriate minority shareholders and results in a worsening of a firm’s profitability. 
Thus, legal person shareholders can bring both costs and benefits to a firm’s 
management that varies at different levels of legal person’s control in a firm.  
 
8.4 Rumelt’s Classification 
 
In my study I classified China’s listed companies into six different categories 
according to their different diversification strategies based on Rumelt’s scheme 
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(Rumelt, 1974). In my comparison of the performance of China’s listed companies, I 
did not find significant difference for both Tobin’s Q and ROA between all of these 
different categories. However, I did find that Single Business and Conglomerate firms 
had a better performance than Dominant Unrelated firms, which suggests a U-shape 
curve for the relationship between firm diversification and firm performance. In 
addition, I observed a clear trend for China’s listed companies to move toward full 
diversification. After I compare the diversification trend of China’s listed firms to that 
of the U.S. firms, I found that the firms in the two contexts show very different 
diversification evolution patterns. China’s companies either do not diversify or the 
companies diversify into many unrelated business sectors. Meanwhile, U.S. firms are 
more inclined to diversify into related industries as a first step toward full 
diversification. Managers of China’s companies hence are more active and prone to 
diversify into unrelated business activities compared to their U.S. peers.  
 
These findings are very important as they lead to the implication that China’s firms 
are possibly in an abnormal transition stage towards rapid diversification, in which 
they escape the necessary steps and thus they might not have sufficient resources to 
support an overly-high level of diversification.  
 
According to Markides (1992), a firm’s control costs and coordination costs rise 
accordingly as a firm continues to diversify. In addition, China’s firms might lack 
sufficient capital, management skill and knowledge to maintain an excessive level 
diversification. All these factors make me expect a negative relationship between firm 
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diversification and firm performance for China’s firms. However, empirically I find 
that firm diversification and firm performance are positively related and that 
conglomerates show at least as good performance as Single Business firms. One 
possible explanation for this result exists in the high transaction costs in China.  It is 
possible that a firm could avoid this high cost through diversifying, and the more a 
firm diversifies, the greater the advantages and benefits it could reap from this 
strategy.  
 
Another explanation rests in the way I identified the ownership identities. In my study, 
I followed the approach of previous scholars to divide a firm’s shareholder into state 
shareholding and legal person shareholding. In testing Hypothesis seven, I separated 
the firms into those controlled by state shareholding and others controlled by legal 
person. I defined the firms whose largest shareholder is a state shareholder as state 
controlled and the firms whose largest shareholder is a legal person shareholder as 
controlled by legal person. As I mentioned earlier, it is a bit simple and unsatisfactory 
to differentiate shareholding into state and legal because legal person shareholding is 
such a complex identity that some of the legal person shareholders are very similar to 
the state, while others are more close to institutional shareholdings or private 
shareholders. It might also be too simple to regard a firm’s largest shareholder as the 
controlling one without considering its weight in the outstanding shareholdings. My 
finding here suggests a future research direction to re-classify the different 
shareholding of a Chinese firm based on more clear definitions. In addition, scholars 
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might also consider dividing all the firms into different categories based on the new 
classification standard. 
 
8.5 Implications and Further Development 
 
My study has identified several key associations between ownership structure, 
diversification strategy and firm performance. The study provides empirical evidence 
to support lines of research on China’s companies’ shareholding as well as their 
diversification strategies. The findings of state and legal person shareholding not only 
improve the understanding of the difference between legal person and state 
shareholding, but also provides new insights to the gradual evolution of China’s 
institutions towards market-oriented and privatization. 
 
My findings can contribute to developments in agency theory and institutional theory. 
Agency theory was developed to deal with the traditional agency problems between 
the principal (shareholders) and the agent (managers). Scholars have extended basic 
concepts in agency theory by studying the identities of principals and agents, such as 
in looking at the role of state shareholders in the context of emerging economies to 
explore the lack of incentive of state ownership to monitor the management (Xu and 
Wang, 1997). I enrich the use of agency theory by exploring the impact of state 
shareholding and legal person shareholding on a firm’s management, diversification 
strategy and its performance.  This enrichment comes from a further expansion of the 
identity issue to provide a finer-grained analysis of the principal-agent relationship, in 
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which I conceptualize and test differences in the preferences and motivations of 
principals, as influencing the activities and strategies that agents pursue in publicly-
owned corporations. 
 
The study of the inborn advantages and limitations of different ownership identities 
helps us to understand how this institutionally created form of ownership has 
influenced the institutional transition process in China. Moreover, my study 
contributes to institutional theory in that I explore the relationship between 
diversification strategy and firm performance, and the trend of China’s firms’ 
diversification evolution. This evolution pattern might offer a unique perspective to 
study the institutional influence on the behavior and response of market players, 
especially in a way different from that of the Western countries. I help develop an 
institutional economics approach to explain how a firm might evolve in its 
diversification strategy and in what direction it evolves towards in a large transition 
economy: China. One reason that China’s firms would choose different 
diversification strategies and grow in a different pattern than that of U.S. firms would 
lie in the different institutional environments that China’s firms are facing, along such 
dimensions such as formal institutions like legal and tax environments, and informal 
institutions like culture and tradition. From the perspective of a diversification 
strategy, I compare the responses of China’s firms, as I find, with the reported 
findings of U.S. firms.  I attribute some of the difference to environmental differences 
between the U.S. and China, and provide evidence that is consistent with an 
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institutional explanation on the behavioral and strategies disparities between firms of 
emerging economies and developed countries. 
 
My study has its limitations. First of all, a research opportunity lies in the role of legal 
person shareholding. As I mentioned these in the previous paragraphs, that scholars 
are not very clear about the essence and core of legal person, and these is confusion 
on its definition as this is a unique shareholding that has yet to appear in the West. To 
better understand the influence of legal person shareholders, it will be beneficial to 
look at the identity of a legal person shareholder to see if that shareholder has state or 
private firm roots.  By providing a more fine-grained classification of the identity of 
legal person shareholders, scholars might be able to better evaluate how a legal 
person shareholder influences a firm’s diversification strategy and its performance.  
Finally, the history and essence of legal person shareholding and thus its effect on 
firm strategy and firm performance, deserves scholars’ further attention and study. 
 
Secondly, scholars need to take further steps in the study of China’s institutional 
environment. Unusual findings in China (as compared to the West) are regarded as a 
result from the unique institution of China, but without direct tests of the institutional 
effect. The literature is not sufficient in providing evidence to show the uniqueness of 
China and how it is different from other emerging economies such as Malaysia, 
Thailand, Poland and Russia. Unless scholars establish quantitative standards to 
measure a country’s institutional environment and compare them to some extent on 
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some level,  it will be difficult to understand the institutional effect on the behavior of 
a firm and human being in a specific context.   
 
Thirdly, the empirical method of GLS also has its own limitations. The main reason 
for me to use GLS is to correct the bias and address the problem of over time 
correlation and heterogeneity for the panel data (1991-2002, all the Chinese listed 
companies). However, this method is vulnerable to the possibility of endogeneity and 
false causality inferences. Understandably, both dive rsification and firm performance, 
and ownership and firm performance could be plagued by endogeneity issues. It is 
possible to use simultaneous equations to address this issue in the future research. 
 
My findings should reinforce the idea that attention should be given to ownership 
identity when examining the influence of ownership concentration on various 
elements of a firm’s strategy and performance. More importantly, I hope my study 
could arouse scholars’ interest and attention in studying China’s institutional and 
market developments and thereby provide direction for future research. I would 
expect to find that research on China’s listed companies is a new phenomenon that 
can provide insights for research on corporate governance and privatization in 



















Table 3-1 Share Classification (Percentage) for the Chinese Stock Market from 1993 to 2002 
 
Share 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
State 45.25 43.67 37.20 34.03 31.03 33.70 35.85 38.97 33.27 31.51 
Legal 26.87 22.04 28.34 30.96 32.93 30.73 28.27 24.54 25.26 28.15 
Employee 2.22 0.99 0.35 1.15 2.01 2.01 1.19 0.64 0.83 0.40 
A Share 14.59 21.18 20.36 21.06 22.44 23.67 26.13 28.55 32.84 34.62 
B Share 5.88 6.11 6.40 6.20 5.95 5.22 4.56 4.01 3.29 2.10 
H Share 5.20 6.01 7.36 6.61 5.65 4.67 4.00 3.29 4.51 0.66 
 
Source: Shanghai Securities Yearbook (1993-2002) 









Table 3-2 Comparison between the literatures on developed countries and 
emerging economies 
 
DEVELOPED COUNTRY EMERGING ECONOMIES 
Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration is positively 
related to firm performance: Berle & 
Means, 1932; Hill & Snell, 1989; 
Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Boeker: 1992 
Ownership concentration is positively 
related to firm performance: Lins, 2002 
Ownership concentration exerts an 
inverted U-shape impact on firm 
performance: Johnson et al, 2000; 
Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000 
Ownership concentration exerts an 
inverted U-shape impact (with steeper 
slope) on firm performance: Singh et al, 
2002 
Ownership concentration is not related to 
firm performance: Demsetz & Lehn, 
1985; Denis & Denis, 1995 
Ownership concentration is not related to 
firm performance: Chen & Gong, 2000 
Ownership Identity 
Government ownership is inferior to 
private ownership: Megginson et al, 
1994; Boycko et al, 1996; Dewenter & 
Malatesta, 2001 
Government ownership is negatively 
related to firm performance: Singh, 2002; 
Megginson et al, 1994 
Government ownership is not necessary 
inferior to private ownership: Caves & 
Christensen, 1980; Wortzel & Wortzel, 
1989 
Legal person is positively related to firm 
performance: Xu & Wang, 1997 
Institutional ownership outperforms 
government ownership: Thomsen & 
Pedersen, 2000 
Two-face relationship between private 
ownership and firm performance: Tan, 
2001a; Tan, 2001b 
Diversification 
Diversification is negatively related to 
firm performance: Lang & Stulz, 1994; 
Servaes, 1996 
Diversification is positive related to firm 
performance: Chang & Choi, 1988; 
Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Palepu & 





Table 5-1 Data Sources 
 
 









DataStream and Bloomberg; 
CSRC (www.csrc.org.cn). 
Industry The business sectors that a firm is operating in 
SIC codes 2, 3, and 4-digit SIC codes of business sectors 
Revenue Breakdown The percentage of revenues in each industry 
Identity of top ten owners 
Type of top ten largest shareholders for every 
listed company: state/legal person/A-share/B-
share/H-share/foreign share/employee share 
Shareholdings of top ten 
owners 
The percentage of shareholdings of top ten 
largest shareholders 
Assets Total assets of every listed company 
Sales Total sales of every listed company 
Debt Total debt of every listed company 







Table 5-2 Distribution of the Sample Firms across Industry Categories (2001) 
 








B-Share H-Share  
Agriculture 0.27 30.72 29.31 37.29 1.03 0.00 1.62 0.00 
Mining 1.73 32.71 35.24 30.12 0.00 1.91 3.56 2.74 
Construction 3.65 33.89 28.66 37.00 0.43 0.00 3.72 0.00 
Manufacturing 59.68 29.34 31.02 32.22 0.56 1.05 5.13 0.65 
Transportation and 
Public Utility 10.14 26.94 34.32 30.42 0.83 0.34 5.71 1.41 
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 10.75 28.85 27.69 41.06 0.47 0.00 1.90 0.00 
Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate 6.48 25.47 30.18 37.44 0.72 1.76 4.40 0.00 
Services 4.66 22.78 36.08 32.64 0.32 0.54 7.16 0.45 
Public 
Administration 0.73 21.06 35.21 38.87 0.33 0.92 2.13 0.00 
 
Source: China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook 2002. 
Note: The figures in the rectangles are all percentages. The percentages in the first column (Sample) describe the distribution of listed 
companies in different industries. The sum of these percentages is not equal to 100% because there exists another category of non-
classifiable.  
Note: The other percentages are calculated as the average of firms in the according industry. For example, there are 32 companies 







Table 5-3 Equity Structure of Listed Companies 
 
Share Type  1992 1995 1998 2001 
Not in Free Circulation     
State  46.35 37.20 33.70 33.27 
Legal Person 26.87 28.34 30.73 25.26 
Employee 3.12 0.35 2.01 0.83 
Total 74.34 65.89 66.44 59.36 
In Circulation     
A-Shares 11.57 20.36 23.67 32.84 
B-Shares 7.88 6.40 5.22 3.29 
H-Shares 6.20 7.36 4.67 4.51 
Foreign Shares 0.00 0.07 0.46 0.80 
Total 25.65 34.19 34.02 41.44 
 
Source: China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook 2001. 
 
Note: The figures in the table are all percentages. They are calculated from the ave rage percentages of the listed companies in the 
according years. For example, in 1992 there are 53 listed companies in the sample. I calculated the percentage of different 






Table 5-4 Ownership Concentration for China’s listed companies in 2002 
 
 Top Shareholder Top Five Shareholders  Top Ten Shareholders  
Maximum 85.00 93.89 96.16 
Minimum 1.95 3.78 4.66 
Mean 43.47 58.51 61.03 
Median 43.17 60.31 62.79 
Standard Deviation 17.50 13.89 13.22 
 
Note: The figures in the table are all percentages. They are calculated based on the top ten largest shareholders for China’s listed 






Table 5-5 Variable Description Summary 
 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable:  
Firm Performance 
 
ROA Net Income/Total Assets 






2 Herfindahl calculated on 4-digit SIC code 
level 





*å ;Concentric Ratio 
Independent Variable  
TOP1 Shareholdings of the largest shareholder 
TOP5 Shareholdings held by top five largest shareholders 
TOP10 Shareholdings held by top ten largest shareholders 
HERF5 Sum of the squared percentage of shares held by top 
largest five shareholders 
STATE the percentage of shareholding held by the State 
shareholder 
LEGAL the percentage of shareholding held by Legal Person shareholder 
Control Variable  
LGASSET The logarithm of total assets 
LGSALE The logarithm of total sales 
DE The ratio of debt to equity (divided by 1000 to increase the coefficient to the proper extent) 
AGE the year of a firm from its establishment till 2002 
IPO the year of a firm from when it had initial public offering (IPO) till 2002 
INDUSTRY 20 dummy variables 
LSH If a firm is listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange, the 
dummy is equal to one, otherwise it is equal to zero 
YEAR 11 dummy variables 
PROVINCE 31 dummy variables 
 
Note: ROA is calculated from the financial statements of a listed company’s annual 
reports. 
Note: Pi and Pj in the formula of diversification level refer to the revenue breakdown 




Table 5-6 Correlation Matrix (1) 
 
Variable MEAN S. D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 ROA .0350 .1895 1.00        
2 Q 2.6230 2.4933 -.040** 1.00       
3 TOP1 7.6407 17.6077 -.043** -.193** 1.00      
4 TOP5 10.2895 22.3888 -.050** -.200** .955** 1.00     
5 TOP10 10.7341 23.2257 -.053** -.200** .948** .999** 1.00    
6 HERF5 0.2378 .1477 .054** -.005 .171** .084** .072** 1.00   
7 STATE .3052 .2646 .013 -.042** .109** .066** .058** .428** 1.00  
8 LEGAL .3075 .2663 .013* .064** -.075** -.041** -.035** -.147** -.873** 1.00 
9 LGASSET 9.0091 .4030 .073** -.277** .171** .159** .157** .238** .146** -.140** 
10 LGSALE 8.6242 .5332 .125** -.226** .145** .127** .124** .258** .158** -.131** 
11 DE 1.7104 21.6084 -.032** .006 -.004 -.002 -.002 -.015 -.015 .006 
12 AGE 6.45 4.384 -.102** -.037** .088** .115** .121** -.280** -.157** .039** 
13 IPO 3.84 2.344 -.157** -.064** .159** .180** .184** -.201** -.096** -.047** 
14 HERF4 .2605 .3685 -.001 .012 .067** .073** .074** -.002 -.054** .041** 
15 EN4 .1489 .1979 -.032** -.039** .220** .231** .232** -.020 -.060** .041** 











Table 5-6 Correlation Matrix (2) 
 
Variable 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 ROA         
2 Q         
3 TOP1         
4 TOP5         
5 TOP10         
6 HERF5         
7 STATE         
8 LEGAL         
9 LGASSET 1.00        
10 LGSALE .780** 1.00       
11 DE .002 -.012 1.00      
12 AGE .025** -.021 .024* 1.00     
13 IPO .171** .061** .049* .489** 1.00    
14 HERF4 .057** -.006 .004 .051** .080** 1.00   
15 EN4 .122** .030* .014 .119** .158** .564** 1.00  
16 CON .092** .024* .009 .076** .095** .689** .816** 1.00 
 
Note:  (1) S.D. refers to standard deviation; 
(2) **, correlation is significant at the 0.01 leve l; 
         *, correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; 




Table 6-1 Revenue Breakdowns of Different Business Sectors of North American 
Rockwell in 1969 
 
Business Area Percentage of Total Revenues Sub-total 
Aircraft and missiles 14.3 
Rocket engines 6.7 
Aerospace systems 19.5 
Aerospace electronics 20.7 
61.2 




Textile machinery 3.8 3.8 
Graphic arts equipment 4.6 4.6 
Other 5.0 5.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: Remelt (1974): 16. 
 
 
Table 6-2 Vertically Related SIC Codes 
 
Supplier Manufacturing Wholesale 
 37 501 
24 25 502 
14 24, 32 503 
 35 504 
10, 12, 14 33 505 
 36 506 
33 34 507 
 38 508 
14 39 509 
24 26 511 
 28 512 
22 23, 31 513 
09 20 514 
01, 02, 07, 08 20 515 
 30 516 
13 29 517 
 20 518 






Table 6-3 Two, Three and Four digit SIC Codes and Revenue Breakdowns of 














Plastic products 30 308 3089 0.8460 
Plastic materials and basic shapes 51 516 5162 0.0420 
Drugs, proprietaries, and sundries 51 512 5122 0.0184 
Medicinals and botanicals 28 283 2833 0.0399 
Biological products exc. 
diagnostic 
28 283 2836 0.0524 




Table 6-4 Revenue Percentages by 2-digit SIC code for Shan Dong Dong-E E-
Jiao CO., Ltd (2001) 
 
Business 2-digit SIC code  Sub-total of revenue 
percentage 
Rubber and Misc. plastic products 30 0.8460 
Wholesale trade-nondurable goods 51 0.0604 
Chemicals and allied product 28 0.0923 















Shan Dong Dong-E E-
Jiao CO., Ltd 0.8460 0.8460 0.8880 
Dominant- 
Vertical 
Gezhouba CO., Ltd 0.8382 0.8382 0 Dominant- Unrelated 
XinJiang TianYe CO., 







Table 6-6 Two, Three and Four digit SIC Codes and Revenue Breakdowns of 














Brick, stone, & related materials 50 503 5032 0.1305 
Heavy construction 16 162 1629 0.8382 
Architectural services 87 871 8712 0.0045 
Surveying services 87 871 8713 0.0049 
Engineering services 87 871 8711 0.0115 
Wrecking and demolition work 17 179 1795 0.0002 
Electrical work 17 173 1731 0.0027 
Non-classifiable establishments 99 999 9999 0.0024 
Non-durable goods 51 519 5199 0.0048 












SIC code  
Revenue 
Percentage 
Wholesale Trade— Durable Goods 50 0.1305 
Heavy Construction, Ex. Building 16 0.8382 
Engineering & Management Services 87 0.0209 
Special Trade Contractors 17 0.0029 
Non-classifiable Establishments 99 0.0024 












Table 6-8 Two, Three and Four digit SIC Codes and Revenue Breakdowns of 














Agricultural chemicals 28 287 2879 0.4757 
Non-residential construction 15 154 1542 0.0184 
Transportation Services 47 478 4789 0.3532 
Manufacturing industries 39 399 3999 0.1018 





Table 6-9 Revenue Percentages By 2-digit SIC code for XinJiang TianYe CO., 
Ltd (1999) 
 
Business 2-digit SIC code  
Revenue 
Percentage 
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 0.5266 
General Building Contractors 15 0.0184 
Transportation Services 47 0.3532 



















1991 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1992 7 0 1 0 0 1 9 
1993 43 0 0 0 0 35 78 
1994 80 1 1 0 0 56 138 
1995 248 3 7 0 0 42 300 
1996 392 7 29 0 0 73 501 
1997 531 14 57 0 0 107 709 
1998 468 16 111 0 0 218 813 
1999 447 17 166 0 0 284 914 
2000 463 25 215 0 0 372 1075 
2001 315 35 319 0 0 400 1069 
2002 337 37 370 1 0 441 1186 
 











Table 6-11 Summary (percentage) of the category of China’s listed companies by year 
 
Year Single Business Dominant Vertical Dominant Unrelated Dominant Linked Related Linked Conglomerate 
1991 100 0 0 0 0 0 
1992 77.77 0 11.11 0 0 11.11 
1993 55.12 0 0 0 0 44.87 
1994 57.97 0.72 0.72 0 0 40.57 
1995 82.66 1 2.33 0 0 14 
1996 78.24 1.39 5.78 0 0 14.57 
1997 74.89 1.97 8.03 0 0 15.09 
1998 57.56 1.96 13.6 0 0 26.81 
1999 48.90 1.86 18.16 0 0 31.07 
2000 43.06 2.32 20 0 0 34.60 
2001 29.46 3.27 29.84 0 0 37.41 
2002 28.41 3.11 31.19 0.08 0 37.18 
 










Table 6-12 Observed Percentage of Firms in Each Strategic Category 
 
Strategic Category 1995 1998 2002 
Major Classes    
Single Business 82.66 57.56 28.41 
Dominant Business 0.00 1.96 3.11 
Related Business 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Unrelated Business 14 40.41 68.37 
Minor Classes    
Single Business 82.66 57.56 28.41 
Dominant Vertical 0.00 1.96 3.11 
Dominant Unrelated 0.00 13.6 31.19 
Dominant Linked 0.00 0.00 0.08 
Related Linked 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Conglomerate 14 26.81 37.18 






Table 6-13 Firms listed from 1995 through 1998 to 2002 
 
Strategic Category 1995 1998 2002 
Major Classes    
Single Business 82.66 51.00 28.66 
Dominant Bus iness 0.00 2.00 3.00 
Related Business 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Unrelated Business 14 45.99 66.33 
Minor Classes    
Single Business 82.66 51.00 28.66 
Dominant Vertical 0.00 2.00 3.00 
Dominant Unrelated 0.00 12.33 31.00 
Dominant Linked 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Related Linked 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Conglomerate 14 33.66 35.33 







Table 6-14 Comparison of a Five-year period for Firms initially listed from 1995 to 1997 
 
Category IPO in 1995 IPO in 1996 IPO in 1997 
Year 1995 2000 1996 2001 1997 2002 
Single Business 83.33 54.16 68.81 47.02 76.55 30.62 
Dominant Vertical 4.16 8.33 0.49 1.48 0.95 3.82 
Dominant Unrelated 0.00 4.16 3.46 26.23 9.56 28.22 
Dominant Linked 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Related Linked 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Conglomerate 12.5 33.33 27.22 25.24 12.91 35.88 





Note: The figures in the table are all percentages except the last row.
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Table 6-15 Transition Rates for 1995-1998 Projected Through 2002 
 
 Percentage of 2002 listed companies 
Category Actual Projected Using 1995-1998 Rates 
Single Business 28.41 34.25 
Dominant Vertical 3.11 4.57 
Dominant Unrelated 31.19 31.73 
Dominant Linked 0.08 0.00 
Related Linked 0.00 0.00 
Conglomerate  37.18 59.51 
 
 
Table 6-16 Rumelt’s Estimated Percentage of Firms in Each Strategic 
Category 
 
Strategic Category 1949 1959 1969 
Major Classes    
Single Business 34.5 16.2 6.2 
Dominant Business 35.4 37.3 29.2 
Related Business 26.7 40.0 45.2 
Unrelated Business 3.4 6.5 19.4 
Minor Classes    
Single Business 34.5 16.2 6.2 
Dominant Vertical 15.7 14.8 15.6 
Dominant Unrelated 0.9 2.6 0.9 
Dominant Linked 18.9 19.8 12.7 
Related Linked 26.7 10.9 23.6 
Conglomerate 3.4 6.5 19.4 
Total number of firms 189 207 183 
 
Source: Rumelt, 1974: 51. 
 
 
Table 6-17 Rumelt’s Transition Rates for 1949-1959 Projected Through 1969 
 
 Percentage of 1969 Top 500 Firms  
Category Actual Projected Using 1949-1959 Rates 
Single Business 6.2 7.5 
Dominant Vertical 15.6 13.4 
Dominant Unrelated 0.9 5.1 
Dominant Linked 12.7 12.0 
Related Linked 45.2 46.7 
Conglomerate  19.4 15.3 
 





Table 7-1 Summary of Empirical Results 
 




Hypothesis 1 For China’s listed companies, there 
is a negative relationship between firm’s 
ownership concentration and diversification level. 
Support 
Hypothesis 2 For China’s listed companies, the 
proportion of state ownership will be negatively 
related to firm’s diversification.  
Support 
Ownership 
Identity & Firm 
Diversification 
Hypothesis 3 For China’s listed companies, 
firm’s diversification will be first negatively and 
then positively related to  the proportion of 





Hypothesis 4 As a firm’s diversification level 
increases, its performance will first be positively 









Hypothesis 5 Firm’s ownership concentration 
would make firm diversification have  a greater 
positive impact on firm performance up to 
moderate levels of diversification, after which it 
would make firm diversification have a greater 
negative impact on firm performance.  
No  
Support 
Hypothesis 6a State shareholding would make 
firm diversification have a greater negative 
impact on firm performance as diversification 
increases. 
No 




Hypothesis 6b Legal Person shareholding would 
make firm diversification have a greater positive 




Hypothesis 7a For the firms with the state 
ownership as majority, Single Business firms will 
show the best performance, followed by Related-
Constrained firms. Unrelated Business firms will 










Hypothesis 7b For the firms with legal person 
shareholding as majority, Related-Linked firms 
will perform best, followed by Unrelated business 








Table 7-2 Ownership Concentration and Firm Diversification 
 
Dependent Variable : Herfindahl_4 
Year 1991-2002 
















IPO -0.0102*** (0.0030) 
-0.0484** 
(0.0229) 
LSH 0.1086*** (0.0134) -- -- 
Y1992 0.1346*** (0.0450) 
-0.1632 
(0.1547) 
Y1993 -0.2207*** (0.0323) 
-0.4606*** 
(0.1334) 
Y1994 -0.2259*** (0.0286) 
-0.4206*** 
(0.1142) 


















Y2000 -0.0050 (0.0181) 
0.0051 
(0.0182) 
Y2001 0.0134 (0.0170) 
0.0212 
(0.0169) 










R-Square 0.0881 0.0970 
 
Notes:  
* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level. 
 
For the meanings of the variables, please refer to Table 5-5.
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Table 7-3 Firm Diversification and State Ownership 
 
Dependent Variable: Herfindahl_4 
Year 1991-2002 










































LSH 0.1073*** (0.0134) -- -- 
0.1069*** 
(0.0134) -- -- 





























































































R-Square 0.0881 0.0965 0.0881 0.0966 
 
Notes:  
* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level. 
 
For the meanings of the variables, please refer to Table 5-5.
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Table 7-4 Firm Diversification and Legal Person Shareholding  
 
Dependent Variable: Herfindahl_4 
Year 1991-2002 










































LSH 0.1074*** (0.0134) -- -- 
0.1072*** 
(0.0134) -- -- 





























































































R-Square 0.0878 0.0963 0.0882 0.0969 
 
Notes:  
* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level. 
 
For the meanings of the variables, please refer to Table 5-5.
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Table 7-5 Firm Performance and Firm Diversification (1) 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q 
Year 1991-2002 










































LSH 0.1214 (0.1065) -- -- 
0.1237 
(0.1066) -- -- 





























































































R-Square 0.2444 0.2225 0.2445 0.2227 
 
Notes:  
* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level. 
 
For the meanings of the variables, please refer to Table 5-5.
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Table 7-6 Firm Performance and Firm Diversification (2) 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Year 1991-2002 










































LSH -0.0085 (0.0053) -- -- 
-0.0084 
(0.0053) -- -- 





























































































R-Square 0.0627 0.0782 0.0628 0.0782 
 
Notes:  
* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level. 
 
For the meanings of the variables, please refer to Table 5-5.
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Table 7-7 Firm Performance, Firm Diversification and Ownership Concentration (1) 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q 
Year 1991-2002 


































































(0.1067) -- -- 
0.1420 







































































































R-Square 0.2467 0.2243 0.2472 0.2248 
Notes:  
* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level. 
For the meanings of the variables, please refer to Table 5-5.
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Table 7-8 Firm Performance, Firm Diversification  and Ownership Concentration (2) 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Year 1991-2002 


































































(0.0053) -- -- 
-0.0094* 







































































































R-Square 0.0662 0.0819 0.0662 0.0820 
Notes:  
* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level. 
For the meanings of the variables, please refer to Table 5-5.
TABLES 
 174 
Table 7-9 Firm Performance, Firm Diversification and State Ownership (1) 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q 
Year 1991-2002 


































































(0.1066) -- -- 
0.1260 







































































































R-Square 0.2446 0.2226 0.2447 0.2229 
Notes:  
* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level. 
For the meanings of the variables, please refer to Table 5-5.
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Table 7-10 Firm Performance, Firm Diversification and State Ownership (2) 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Year 1991-2002 


































































(0.0053) -- -- 
-0.0083 







































































































R-Square 0.0635 0.0785 0.0641 0.0792 
Notes:  
* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level. 
For the meanings of the variables, please refer to Table 5-5.
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Table 7-11 Firm Performance, Firm Diversification and Legal Person (1) 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q 
Year 1991-2002 


































































(0.1065) -- -- 
0.1278 







































































































R-Square 0.2444 0.2226 0.2449 0.2232 
Notes:  
* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level. 
For the meanings of the variables, please refer to Table 5-5.
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Table 7-12 Firm Performance, Firm Diversification and Legal Person (2) 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Year 1991-2002 
Method Random Fixed Random Fixed 







HERF_42   -0.0049 (0.0361) 
-0.0014 
(0.0448) 














LEGAL*HERF_42   -0.0075 (0.0711) 
-0.0053 
(0.0876) 




























LSH -0.0086 (0.0053) -- -- 
-0.0084 
(0.0053) -- -- 
























































































R-Square 0.0637 0.0787 0.0637 0.0787 
Notes:  
* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level. 
 
For the meanings of the variables, please refer to Table 5-5. 
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Table 7-13 Performance Comparison for Firms (1991-2002) 
 
Rumelt’s 





State Controlled      
1 Single Business 2020 0.0409 -- -- 2.5266 -- -- 
2 Dominant Vertical 84 0.0142  2.2722  
3 Dominant Unrelated 689 0.0244 A 2.2042 A 
4 Dominant Linked 0 -- --  -- --  
5 Related Linked 0 -- --  -- --  
6 Conglomerate 1055 0.0374 C 2.5667 C 






1 Single Business 1209 0.0424 -- -- 2.9018 -- -- 
2 Dominant Vertical 50 0.0208  2.8660  
3 Dominant Unrelated 466 0.0194 A 2.8065  
4 Dominant Linked 0 -- --  -- --  
5 Related Linked 0 -- --  -- --  
6 Conglomerate 793 0.0338  2.9973 C 
Sub-Total 2518 0.0350  2.9135  
 
Note: Differences in means tested for each grouping using ANOVA, with 
random and fixed effects, and an LSD test for comparisons of 
means across categories (at 0.1 significance level). A indicates 
mean of category for performance measure significantly different 
than that for firms in the Single Business category. B indicates 
mean of category for performance measure significantly different 
than that for firms in the Dominant Vertical category. C indicates 
mean of category for performance measure significantly different 


















































Figure 6-1 Product Flow and Revenue Breakdown for Alcoa in 1969 
 
 
Notes: Figures in rectangles are the percentages of total revenues attributable to each 
product area. 






















































Source: Rumelt (1974): 30. 











Single Business Dominant Business
Related Business Unrelated Business
 
 















Single Business Dominant Vertical Dominant Unrelated
Dominant Linked Related Linked Conglomerate
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Figure 7-1 Firm Diversification and Legal Person Shareholding (Random Effect) 
 
 
Note: Firm Diversification is measured by 4-digit herfindahl and calculated while holding values for all other variables at mean levels, 
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Note: Firm Diversification is measured by 4-digit herfindahl. Firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q and calculated while 
holding values for all other variables at mean levels, for a firm in the industry of miscellaneous, in the province of Liaoning and listed 
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